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PREFACE 
 
In September 2001, the Dalit movement made its way into the international news stream, 
when more than two hundred Indian NGO activists agitated against the discrimination of 
the formerly so-called untouchable castes under the banner of ‘Dalit Human Rights’ at 
the NGO forum accompanying the United Nations’ ‘World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ in Durban, South Africa. 
The participation of the Indian NGO activists at the UN conference marked the 
globalisation of the term ‘Dalit’, which today is part of the shared ‘politically correct’ 
vocabulary of NGOs, scholars and the media in India and internationally.  
It was also about this time that I first heard the word ‘Dalit’. Though I had 
spent a year in Bangalore, the capital of the south Indian state Karnataka, as a volunteer 
in a cultural exchange programme in 1993 and later on studied several courses on Indian 
ethnography, I had never come across the term before. Little did I know that the topics 
‘Dalit identity’ and ‘Dalit politics’ would soon outdo ‘communalism’ and ‘Hindu 
nationalism’ as the preferred objects of research in the study of popular politics in 
contemporary India. In this regard, the present study reflects the contemporary appeal 
and strength of the Indian Dalit movement, even as it exposes its weaknesses.  
The thesis has been long under way. In the course of the over nine years that 
have passed since I completed my fieldwork in November 2003, the Dalit movement in 
Karnataka has developed and changed: new organisations and alliances have emerged, 
old ones have fallen apart and the key issues of the movement have shifted with the 
overall political development. However, the fundamental dilemmas related to the 
assertion and politicisation of Dalit identity remain topical and I believe that the thesis – 
for all its shortcomings – contributes to a fuller understanding of the internal 
contradictions, which continue to characterise the Dalit movement in Karnataka and in 
India at large.  
I owe my sincere thanks to all the leaders, activists and sympathisers of the 
Dalit movement who spent hours and days discussing with me and explained me about 
their lives and political visions. Everywhere, I was received with incredible enthusiasm, 
friendliness and hospitality. I also owe my heartfelt thanks to Gauri, my long-time friend, 
who – as always – received me with exceptional hospitality and supported me 
unconditionally throughout the fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTING IDEAS OF DALIT LIBERATION 
 
‘Dalit is just a notion, Madam!’ The middle-aged university reader raised his voice and 
looked insistently at me. ‘There are no Dalits,’ he continued: ‘It is just a notion, an 
imagination. It has no cultural base, it has no social base, not even a political base and I 
don’t think that the term Dalit will be there in ten years.’ It was one of my last days of 
fieldwork. During the past eleven months, I had come across some rather diverging 
interpretations – and even rejections – of Dalit identity. Still, nobody had so forcefully 
insisted on giving up ‘Dalit’ as the collective designation of the ‘untouchable’ castes and 
with that the very idea of inter-caste solidarity, as did this man. The Bangalore-based 
university reader, T.H. Murthy, had participated in the Dalit movement for many years 
and now had his own small, independent group of followers. He was utterly disappointed 
with the meagre results of the Dalit movement’s struggle and had started encouraging the 
formation of a strong caste-based organisation with the purpose of establishing banks, 
educational institutions and medical services exclusively for the social and economic 
uplift of the Holeya caste, to which he himself belonged.  
It was a disillusioned man who spoke to me that afternoon, a man who had 
once strongly believed in the promises of the Dalit movement’s groundbreaking struggle 
against discrimination, humiliation and poverty and in the long-term goal of a complete 
abolition of caste distinctions. Now he was deeply frustrated over the missing solidarity 
between the different castes participating in the Dalit movement and over what he 
considered as the egoism of the emerging Dalit middleclass, including many of the 
leaders of the Dalit movement. Most importantly, he had radically changed his views on 
the social institution of caste and had begun to regard caste communities as the natural 
loci of solidarity and as powerful vehicles for social change. In his view, focus had to be 
changed from struggling against the widespread discrimination and human rights 
violations to struggling for the education and economic development of particularly the 
rural sections of the ‘untouchable’ caste communities. ‘So far, for all these years we 
have unnecessarily wasted our energy to protest against the practice of untouchability, 
but nothing has happened, there is no relaxation. Madam, we should forget about the 
concept of untouchability and start our own institutions in the name of community.’  
A few days before my meeting and interview with T.H. Murthy, I had 
interviewed another long-time Dalit activist, the writer and journalist Indudhara 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Honnapura. After a ten-year pause, he had recently rejoined the Dalit movement together 
with a couple of other experienced senior activists with the aim of revitalising the large, 
leading Dalit organisation in Karnataka, the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti (DSS), the 
organisation in which also T.H. Murthy had earlier participated. Like T.H. Murthy, 
Indudhara Honnapura was frustrated and disappointed with the contemporary Dalit 
movement, but for completely different reasons. Indudhara Honnapura thought that the 
Dalit movement was presently falling apart and weakening itself, because new 
organisations within the movement chose to mobilise people on the basis of distinct 
‘untouchable’ caste identities, instead of organising them collectively in the name of 
Dalits against the very institution of caste.  
Indudhara Honnapura was one of the young leftist writers, who in the early 
1970s instigated the formation of the Dalit movement in Karnataka. He was now in his 
late forties and had been very successful as a journalist, for many years running his own 
mainstream political news magazine. Like T.H. Murthy, Indudhara Honnapura had thus 
managed to move away from his impoverished, rural background and entered the 
affluent urban middle class. Still, he did not find the struggle for economic uplift of the 
‘untouchable’ castes nearly as important as the struggle against caste and untouchability. 
‘Economic empowerment is good, but that is not the ultimate thing for Dalits,’ he 
explained. In his opinion the main problem for the ‘untouchable’ castes was still the 
stigmatisation and discrimination associated with their low position in the religiously 
sanctioned caste hierarchy. Even though practices of untouchability had decreased 
considerably over the past decades, he explained, discrimination was now again 
becoming socially acceptable in wider circles as a consequence of the communalist 
discourses of the ruling Hindu nationalist ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP). ‘See, even in 
Bangalore, this so-called cosmopolitan city, people are practising untouchability. In the 
hotels [teahouses], they are keeping separate glasses for the sweeper community people. 
The same vessels cannot be used by other people.’ In Indudhara Honnapura’s 
understanding, it was the Hindu ideology of purity and pollution, declaring some people 
as elevated and pure and others as low and polluting, which was the root cause of the 
former ‘untouchable’ castes’ persistent suffering. To end discrimination, it was therefore 
necessary to challenge and subvert the very institution of caste and its religious 
underpinnings. ‘If caste is not totally eradicated, discrimination cannot be avoided,’ he 
declared. 
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The line of inquiry  
The very different approaches to caste, identity and Dalit movement politics, expressed 
by the two senior Dalit activists, set the scene for the present study and illustrate the 
profound internal contradictions in the Dalit movement in Karnataka at the beginning of 
the 2000s. After thirty years of struggle, the political identity of Dalit was increasingly 
coming under pressure from different sides within the movement, while the aims, 
demands and strategies of the movement were becoming gradually more heterogeneous 
and internally contradictory compared to earlier times.  
  As illustrated by the statements of the two activists, some of the overriding 
differences of opinion were related to the political priorities of the Dalit movement and 
to the meanings attributed to the social institution of caste. While the Dalit movement 
had originally been a radical anti-caste movement blaming the social and economic 
deprivation of the ‘untouchable’ castes on the inhuman and oppressive institution of 
caste, still more Dalit activists and organisations now voiced the opinion that caste was 
an integral, even natural part of Indian culture and history, which could and should not 
be abolished. According to this line of reasoning, it was the unequal distribution of 
power, wealth and social status between the different castes in the Indian society which 
was the problem, not the institution of caste in itself. The Dalit movement was thus 
marked by the schism that has characterised most identity-based social movements for 
the past more than thirty years from the movements of gays and lesbians, women and 
African Americans in Europe and North America to the indigenous peoples’ movements 
in South and Central America (Bernstein 1997; Gamson 1995; Hervik 2001; Jasper 
2010). In all cases some factions reject the notion of essentially different cultural 
identities while others celebrate it. The notion of identity thus gives rise to profound 
dilemmas when it is used in the political interest of historically oppressed and 
stigmatised groups, while the articulation of cultural difference in relation to the rest of 
the society may simultaneously expose the social and political differences and divisions 
within the group.  
In this thesis, I address the growing political split of the Dalit movement in 
Karnataka in the beginning of the 2000s and discuss why the politicisation of caste and 
Dalit identity was giving rise to such profound internal disagreements. What was causing 
the increasing discontent of many Dalit activists and why had large parts of the Dalit 
movement in reality abandoned the struggle against caste and untouchability in favour of 
a struggle for cultural recognition and political power and representation?  
Central to the study is the political identity of Dalit, which for decades has 
united the activists and sympathisers of the Dalit movement. Literally, the Sanskrit-
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derived word dalit means ‘split’, ‘broken’ or ‘torn to pieces’ and in Hindi, Marathi and 
other north Indian languages the word has been used as a common expression for poor 
and oppressed people long before the emergence of the Dalit movement (Shah 2001b: 
195). However, it was not until the emergence of the Dalit movement in the early 1970s 
that ‘Dalit’ (now usually with a capital D) was coined as a political identity. The 
incipient Dalit movement used ‘Dalit’ as a self-chosen, proud and defiant identity to 
express their resistance and contempt towards the institution of caste and to counter the 
degrading and polluting connotations of the proper names of the ‘untouchable’ castes. By 
the 2000s, however, the identity of Dalit had lost much of its revolutionary zest as the 
term had crept into the popular and politically correct vocabulary of the media, the 
academia and the NGOs as a common designation for either the ‘untouchable’ castes or 
the slightly larger administrative category of Scheduled Castes to which the 
‘untouchable’ castes belong. As this study shows, however, the political and cultural 
meanings ascribed to the identity of Dalit still varied considerably within the Dalit 
movement and continued to be an issue of contestation. 
The past decade, a number of studies from different parts of India have 
discussed the political conflicts on the interpretation of Dalit identity that everywhere 
seems to divide the Dalit movement (Chigateri 2008; Ciotti 2010; Gorringe 2005b; Guru 
2001; Guru & Chakravarty 2005; Racine & Racine 1998; Shah 2001b). Many of these 
studies are very critical of the new, contemporary tendencies of Dalit politics that give 
priority to issues of community building and cultural identity formation instead of 
struggling against the overall structures of caste and class. It is argued that the new, 
community-oriented brand of Dalit struggle is detrimental to the interest of 
impoverished, rural Dalits because it largely disregards the struggle against poverty 
(Guru & Chakravarty 2005; Shah 2001b), and because the struggle for cultural and 
political recognition allegedly ends up consolidating the very structures and identities of 
caste that cause the oppression (Gorringe 2005b; Shah 2001a). Writing on the Dalit 
movement in the state of Tamil Nadu, the Belgian sociologist, Hugo Gorringe (2005b) 
moreover argues that the contemporary ‘identity politics’ of the Dalit movement is 
leading to innumerable caste-based divisions that weaken the movement and undermine 
inter-caste solidarity between the ‘untouchable’ castes.  
  Regrettably, these severe critiques have not yet been followed up by studies 
that attempt to understand the emotions and political rationales that give rise to the 
changes in political visions and priorities of large parts of the Dalit movement. As the 
American sociologist, Mary Bernstein, rightly notes ‘analyses of identity are often mixed 
with normative political evaluations about what constitutes worthwhile collective efforts 
geared toward social change’ (Bernstein 2005: 66), while the underlying rationales, 
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motivations and strategies of the activists are often left unexplained. Therefore, the main 
analytical ambition of this thesis is to shed light on the different perceptions, experiences 
and emotions of identity and caste that inform the political opinions of Dalit leaders and 
activists in Karnataka.   
  In the course of the following chapters, I will look into the political schism of 
the Dalit movement in its historical and contemporary (early 2000s) contexts and 
examine a number of different political positions expressed by former and present 
members of the Dalit movement in Karnataka. Taking the political identity of Dalit as a 
starting point, I will describe how this identity has been represented and negotiated in 
relation to the shifting political agendas of the Dalit movement since its early emergence 
and show how contemporary political positions are related to radically different visions 
of equality, culture and community. 
  The analysis draws on a wide body of analytical work notably by scholars of 
anthropology, sociology and political science as it examines the historicity of the 
conflicting identity claims and political agendas of different parts of the Dalit movement 
and looks into the self-assessments, evaluations and emotions that gives rise to the very 
different views on caste, identity and Dalit liberation. While the main emphasis is on the 
meanings attributed to caste and identity by leaders and activists at the time of fieldwork 
and on their contemporary political views and visions, I have chosen also to include the 
historical development of the movement and its political fragmentation in the analysis. In 
doing so, I attempt to show that the political disagreements in the Dalit movement over 
questions of caste and identity have evolved as part of a general political development in 
which issues of cultural and religious identity have gradually become more central in 
national and international politics compared to issues of economic development and 
redistribution. However, it is the overall argument of the thesis that the increasing splits 
and conflicts in the Dalit movement of Karnataka are not only the result of a widespread 
change in the ideological and strategic approaches to the issue of Dalit liberation, but 
actually reflect a general ambiguity towards the institution of caste among most of the 
Dalit activists. The contradictory interpretations of caste and identity do therefore not 
only profoundly split the Dalit movement, they also present a dilemma to the individual 
activist, which is difficult to solve without making personal and political compromises.   
  In focusing on the Dalit movement in a single Indian state, the thesis 
emphasises the localised nature of Dalit politics in India. The numerous organisations of 
the Dalit movement have traditionally confined themselves to the state in which they 
originate and even though NGO networks as well as the political party, the ‘Bahujan 
Samaj Party’ (BSP), have attempted to mobilise followers across state boundaries since 
the mid-1990s, the Dalit movement generally remains rooted in state politics. Since the 
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social composition, internal debates and political challenges of the Dalit movement vary 
considerably from state to state, detailed localised studies are essential for understanding 
the greater picture of the Dalit movement and the dilemmas informing the political 
choices of its leaders and activists. Studies of the Dalit movement from different Indian 
states thus reveal large differences in the political agendas and identities pursued and 
promoted, as well as a striking similarity in some of the strategic and emotional 
dilemmas confronted (e.g., Chigateri 2008; Ciotti 2010; Gorringe 2005a; Hardtmann 
2003; Pai 2002).1 Despite the fact that the Dalit movement in Karnataka for many years 
was one of the strongest and most dynamic and groundbreaking Dalit movements in the 
country (Omvedt 1993: 62pp.) there exist only few contemporary studies of the 
movement published in English (notably Chigateri 2008). Today, the Dalit movement in 
Karnataka has lost its leading position, yet the heterogeneity of organisations 
participating in the movement and the vastly different viewpoints and agendas it 
encompasses makes it an appropriate place to study the ongoing negotiation of Dalit 
identity and the dilemmas involved in the process.  
 
Political dilemmas of stigmatised identities 
Collective identity formation plays an important part in the making of all social 
movements. To mobilise people for collective action it is essential to be able to formulate 
a distinct collective identity as a basis for the political conflict that the movement 
promotes (Bernstein 2005; della Porta & Diani 2006). This counts for the classic labour 
movements (Famiglietti 2001) as well as for the so-called ‘new social movements’ like 
for example the environmentalist movement, the women’s movement and the peace 
movement. In this regard, identity should not be thought of as a property or specific 
characteristic of individual participants or a group of collective actors, but as the 
meanings attributed to their traits, life occurrences and social situation that are produced 
in the process of mobilisation and collective action (della Porta & Diani 2006). Though 
usually portrayed – and portraying themselves – as a homogenous and coherent group, 
participants of social movements generally have quite different personal and political 
motives for participating. It is thus through the process of collective action that the ‘we’ 
of the movement is developed among the participants in contrast to the ‘they’ of the 
movement’s political opponents and along with that the feelings of solidarity and 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that the Dalit movement does not really have a pan-Indian presence, but is 
essentially restricted to the state of Maharashtra, the three south Indian states Karnataka, Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and to the northern states of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. In 
other states, people belonging to the ‘untouchable’ castes have been drawn towards other political 
movements, like the militant, Maoist movement of Naxalites in Bihar or the Hindu nationalist 
movement in Gujarat – or they have simply not involved themselves much in popular politics.  
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belonging that tie the participants together (ibid. 2006). This also counts for the 
participants of the Dalit movement in Karnataka who have usually not identified 
themselves as ‘Dalits’ before getting involved in the movement.  
However, political mobilisation around a stigmatised identity, like that of Dalit, 
presents a number of strategic and emotional dilemmas since the stigmatised identity is 
both the basis of oppression and the basis of political power (Gamson 1995: 390). Social 
movements of Dalits, African Americans, indigenous people, women, and gays and 
lesbians among others thus share the condition that the identities around which the 
respective movements are organised are also the basis of the discrimination and 
contempt that the activists and followers suffer and struggle to overcome. In these 
movements, a shared collective identity is not only prerequisite for – and a corollary of –
joint mobilisation; the notion of identity is also deployed strategically to further the 
movements’ aims of profoundly changing the imposed, stigmatised identities of the 
participants (Bernstein 1997, 2005). Mobilising people on the basis of a stigmatised 
identity, however, always entails the risk of reinforcing not only the imposed identity of 
the group, but also the stigma adhering to it. The realisation of this dilemma – ‘the 
dilemma of stigmatized identities’, as the American sociologist and social movement 
scholar James Jasper (2010) terms it – has indeed been one of the strongest arguments 
against the Dalit movement’s increased focus on recognition (cf. Gorringe 2005b; Shah 
2001a). Gorringe thus argues that the ‘identity politics’ of the Dalit movement in effect 
has ‘rejuvenated a politics of caste rather than undermining the basis on which Dalits 
[…] are oppressed’ and hence diluted its original anti-caste ideology (2005b: 660). On 
the other hand, Gorringe acknowledges that caste identities – in spite of their constructed 
character – are socio-political facts which cannot be ignored or wished away and that a 
decidedly non-identitarian ideal of politics would render political resistance to caste-
based discrimination and oppression impossible (ibid. 667pp.).  
Comparing the Dalit movement in India to the movement of African 
Americans in the United States, Jasper shows that the two movements historically both 
have been torn between pursuing a politics of ‘mainstreaming’ and a politics of 
separatism (Jasper 2010). The same two political impulses are according to the American 
sociologists Joshua Gamson (1995) and Mary Bernstein (1997; 2005) found in the 
movements of lesbians and gays and in the women’s movement in the United States. It is 
thus a general dilemma for social movements of stigmatised groups to decide whether to 
work for inclusion in the mainstream society and thus for a dissolution of their separate 
identity or to stress their cultural difference and uniqueness and uphold a distance to the 
hegemonic society that excludes and discriminates against them exactly because of this 
identity. While the struggle against the imposition of identity tends to present the 
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stigmatised groups as victims of the oppression of the hegemonic ‘mainstream’ society, 
the struggle for cultural recognition and autonomy, on the other hand, emphasises 
cultural pride and self-glorification (Ciotti 2010; Jasper 2010). The strategic dilemma of 
stigmatised identities thus entails a choice between victimhood and self-glorification 
which has direct consequences for the self-image and self-esteem of the activists.  
None of the above scholars directly reflects on the relation between the 
individual and the community when they address the political dilemmas inherent to 
political struggles against identity-based discrimination. However, the case of the Dalit 
movement in Karnataka shows that it is fundamental to examine the meanings attributed 
to the relationship between the individual and the community when analysing the 
contradictory impulses of mainstreaming and separatism that divide political movements 
of stigmatised communities. When the Dalit movement in Karnataka is torn between a 
desire to undermine and completely take apart the social institution of caste and a desire 
to nurture and glorify the unique identities of the Scheduled Castes, it is thus reflecting 
the existence of two very different ways of perceiving caste and identity. As I shall 
argue, the political schism of the Dalit movement does therefore not only reflect a 
strategic dilemma, but also a much deeper personal and emotional dilemma, relating to 
the innate dichotomy between the individual and the community (Mines 1994) and to the 
ambiguous reality of caste (Fuller 2001; Jayaram 1996). How Dalit identity is understood 
and represented by activist of the Dalit movement is in other words intimately related to 
the way that the institution of caste itself is experienced and construed. 
 
Caste in contemporary India: Hierarchy or difference? 
The political schism dividing the Dalit movement has maybe been most directly 
pronounced by the NGO network the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights 
(NCDHR), which took the question of caste to the UN world conference in Durban 2001 
and argued that ‘casteism’ is actually a form of racism. The NCDHR used – and still 
uses2 – the slogan ‘let’s cast out caste’ simultaneously with the slogan ’Dalit – a people, 
a culture, a history’ indicating on the one hand that caste is ‘bad’ and should be abolished 
and on the other that the Dalits constitute a community with a unique culture and history 
that should be celebrated and preserved.  
The two evidently contradictory slogans represent two concurrent, but radically 
different interpretations of caste, which are not only prevalent in the Dalit movement, but 
permeate the entire Indian society as well as the scholarly approaches to caste. As a 
                                                 
2 See the website of NCDHR at:  http://www.ncdhr.org.in    
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number of scholars have pointed out, the notion of caste at the same time denotes a rigid, 
univocal, religiously sanctioned status hierarchy encompassing the entire Indian Hindu 
population and the totality of discrete, culturally different communities that compete for 
status, power and collective rights in the Indian society (Fuller 2001, Gupta 2004, 
Jayaram 1996, Srinivas 1996). In the words of the Indian sociologist N. Jayaram, castes 
can thus ‘be viewed either as being functionally interrelated in a system contributing to 
the vertical integration of a rigidly stratified society, or as autonomous groups serving 
common purposes and striving for common ends. Viewed as the former, castes 
constitutes a structural principle of society, and viewed as the latter, it acts as a dynamic 
force in interest of articulation, collective mobilisation, and social movement’ (1996: 
71).3  
The most well-known and influential academic proponent of the idea of caste 
as constituting a univocal hierarchical system is undisputedly the French anthropologist 
Louis Dumont. In his principal work, Homo Hierarchicus, Dumont (2002) argues that the 
caste hierarchy is the quintessential feature of Indian society and structured by a religious 
principle of ritual purity that subordinates secular power to religious status. According to 
this interpretation, the caste hierarchy and its underpinning principles of graded degrees 
of ritual purity and pollution are accepted and internalised by all Hindus, high and low 
and therefore it makes no sense to talk about power, oppression or discrimination in 
connection to caste.  
By now, a large number of ethnographic studies have shown that the hierarchy 
of caste is not marked by consensus – and probably never was (Fuller 2001).4 Still, the 
hierarchical model of the Indian caste order, now usually depicting caste as an essentially 
oppressive social institution, is widely prevalent among scholars, activists and the 
general public in India and abroad, making the predominant lay notion of caste equal to 
the dominant academic view (Gupta 2000). Increasingly, however, another view of caste 
is gaining ground among scholars that emphasise the cultural or ethnic-like properties of 
caste (Charsley & Karanth 1998; Reddy 2005). One of the most ardent proponents of this 
interpretation, the Indian sociologist Dipankar Gupta (2000; 2004; 2005), argues that 
caste is essentially based on cultural difference. According to Gupta, castes are, first and 
foremost, discrete social entities that define themselves in relation to each other and 
compete internally to further their respective social, economic and cultural interests. The 
Indian caste order is thus characterised by contesting notions of hierarchy, since all 
                                                 
3 Italics by the author.  
4 In fact, this should also have been quite evident in 1966 when the French edition of Homo 
Hierarchicus was first published, considering the widespread political struggle of the lower castes 
against the dominance of the Brahminical castes, not least in the State of Tamil Nadu (then 
‘Madras State’) where Dumont made his fieldwork.  
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castes aim for a higher social status and no caste will accept to occupy the lowest 
position in the status hierarchy. In this interpretation, caste is a form of social 
stratification that rests on differences of culture and identity and not the result of a 
consensual or imposed Hindu ideology of purity and pollution that permanently fixes the 
social status of all communities.  
As this thesis will demonstrate, both notions of hierarchy and notions of 
difference inform the Dalit activists’ attitudes towards caste in Karnataka. Many – maybe 
even most – Dalit activists at the same time experience their caste identities as a reason 
for denial of respect, individuality and human worth and as a source of solidarity and 
belonging. Caste is thus interpreted both as a hierarchical and oppressive social structure 
and as a valuable social institution that contributes positively to the cultural identity of 
the individual. The strategic dilemma of the Dalit movement whether to struggle for the 
complete abolition of caste or for the social and economic strengthening of the 
Scheduled Castes – collectively or individually – is therefore also an emotional dilemma. 
As the Indian literary critic, D.R. Nagaraj (1993) has pointed out the Dalit movement’s 
historic struggle to abolish caste in fact constitutes ‘a wilful amnesia’ towards its past, 
since the erasure of caste distinctions inevitably entails a loss of cultural identity and 
belonging.  
While issues of identity, culture and belonging play an increasingly important 
part in the contemporary Dalit movement, it is still quite common for – particularly 
foreign – politicians, scholars and NGO workers to emphasise only the hierarchical 
interpretation of caste and unanimously condemn all practices of caste as oppressive, 
humiliating and intrinsically wrong.5 Regrettably, the interpretation of caste as 
unequivocally backward, immoral and pernicious prevents the understanding of the 
current developments and political controversies in the Indian Dalit movement and may 
even be detrimental to the cause of the groups that e.g., NGOs wish to support (Lerche 
2008). 
 
Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into a further six chapters in which the argument is gradually 
developed. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I will briefly describe the empirical field of the 
study and account for some of the methods that I have used to generate ethnographic 
data. 
                                                 
5 An example of a prominent NGO – or rather NGO network – that unambiguously condemns 
caste for being an intrinsically oppressive social institution is the Copenhagen-based 
‘International Dalit Solidarity Network’ (IDSN).  See http://www.idsn.org  
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Chapter 3 describes how the social category of ‘Untouchables’ has been 
constructed, politicised and institutionalised in the course of the 19th century as part of 
the overall processes of democratisation and modernisation in pre- and post-colonial 
India as a means of contextualising the schism of the contemporary Dalit movement.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the history of the Dalit movement in Karnataka from 
its emergence in the early-mid 1970s up until the early 2000s and describe how the 
identity of Dalit has been interpreted and negotiated in relation to the changing and still 
more differentiated and contradictory political agendas of the movement.  
In Chapter 5, I examine the ideological and strategic dilemmas related to the 
representation of Dalit identity. Taking a departure in the notion of Dalit identity, I 
examine how ‘Dalit’ is interpreted by different activists and organisations and how these 
interpretations are related to conceptions of oppression and liberation.  
In Chapter 6, I examine the some of the personal and emotional dilemmas 
related to the politicisation of caste identity and point out how these dilemmas are related 
to the ambiguous meanings of caste and cultural identity in contemporary India.   
Finally, in Chapter 7, I briefly sum up the main findings of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
APPROACHING THE EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL FIELD 
 
The fieldwork took place in and around Bangalore6, the capital of Karnataka, between 
December 2002 and November 2003.  
Being the capital city, Bangalore is home to many different types of Dalit 
organisations and political networks from students groups and neighbourhood 
associations to political parties and internationally funded NGOs. Some of the most 
prominent leaders and intellectuals of the Dalit movement live in Bangalore and 
throughout the year demonstrations, political meetings and seminars of the Dalit 
movement take place in the city. The choice of Bangalore as the primary site of 
fieldwork thus made it possible for me to include a number of different Dalit 
organisations and groupings in the study and enabled a broad-based approach to the 
analysis of Dalit identity politics, making use of juxtapositions and comparisons of 
identity claims and political positions. 
Compared with the rural areas in Karnataka, however, the Dalit movement is 
rather weak in Bangalore, where people from the slums and from the so-called ‘creamy 
layer’ urban middleclass are generally less inclined to identify themselves as Dalits. The 
grassroots level of the Dalit movement in Bangalore is therefore not typical of the 
movement in other parts of Karnataka, particularly not the rural areas which continue to 
be the stronghold of the movement. Because of the relatively low support of city 
dwellers, many Bangalore-based activists gave priority to the rural areas and spent much 
of their time visiting local branches of their respective organisations in smaller towns and 
villages. In fact, many activists were constantly on the move between meetings, seminars 
and demonstrations in different districts of the state and some leaders also went to other 
parts of India or even abroad. In order to participate actively in the movement I therefore 
often accompanied leaders and activists from different organisations in Bangalore to 
places outside the city to participate in political functions, protest rallies or meetings with 
local grassroots. The many trips outside Bangalore significantly broadened the empirical 
field of my study as I met activists from many different towns and villages in southern 
                                                 
6 ‘Bangalore’ is an anglicised version of Bengaluru, which is the name of the city in Kannada 
language. In 2005, the government of Karnataka decided to rename Bangalore as Bengaluru. 
However, the new spelling has not yet caught on in written English and since this study took place 
before the renaming, I have chosen to retain the spelling ‘Bangalore’.  
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Karnataka and learned about the local struggles of the Dalit movement that typically 
regarded concrete instances of discrimination and inter-caste conflict.  
Even though I had initially chosen Bangalore as the geographical site of the 
study, the scope of my fieldwork thus gradually broadened as I followed the activists of 
various Dalit movement organisations through different locations and studied how Dalit 
identity was expressed and represented by different actors. The definition of the 
empirical field of the study was therefore an ongoing process in which new 
organisations, locations and informants were gradually included as I became aware of 
them and their relevance for the study. My study thereby differs from most other field-
based studies of the Dalit movement that tend to focus on either single Dalit 
organisations (e.g., Gorringe 2005a; Pai 2002) or compare two or three organisations 
within the broader context of the Dalit movement (e.g., Chigateri 2008).7  
The broad, processual approach to the definition of the field helped me to 
recognise the complex web of personal and organisational relations that intertwine the 
different parts of the Dalit movement and tie them together in a loose network structure 
across political barriers. Like other social movements, the Dalit movement in Karnataka 
is characterised by what the Italian social movement scholars Donatela della Porta and 
Mario Diani describe as ‘dense, informal networks”, in which ‘individual and organised 
actors, while keeping their autonomy and independence, engage in sustained exchanges 
of resources in pursuit of common goals’ (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21). As a social 
movement, the Dalit movement is not just a contemporary totality of individuals, groups 
and formal organisations that organise themselves politically in the name of Dalits. It is 
rather a dynamic social space where identities, strategies and political visions are 
continuously negotiated and where alliances and collaborations between the different 
collective actors are regularly formed and broken. As I have already mentioned a number 
of individuals and organisations in fact rejected the term Dalit, but did nonetheless form 
part of the Dalit movement since they were identified as part of the movement by other 
actors and were engaged in the same broadly defined collective struggle against caste-
based discrimination and oppression.8  
                                                 
7 My approach to the Dalit movement as a field of study to some extent resembles that of the 
Swedish anthropologist Eva-Maria Hardtmann, who in her study of the Dalit movement defines 
her field as ‘interrelational’ (2003: 17) and describes how she was ‘moving among people, things 
and ideas’ in a number of different locations (ibid. 35). While Hardtmann’s methodical strategy of 
‘following the field’ led her to a number of different locations around India and ended up taking 
her to various Buddhist communities in England, the frame of the state of Karnataka, however,  
remains important to this study. 
8 Following a general trend in contemporary social movement theory (della Porta & Diani 2006; 
Zald and McCarthy 1987), I make a distinction between social movements and social movement 
organisations, with the latter being independent organisations participating in the larger 
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Informants and field methods 
When I arrived in Bangalore in December 2002, I had no pre-established contact with 
any organisations or activists participating in the Dalit movement. Except for a few 
organisations, notably the Dalit NGOs and the state branch of the ‘Bahujan Samaj Party’ 
(BSP), the organisations in the Dalit movement had no offices or official telephone 
numbers, let alone web sites or e-mail addresses.9 To get in touch with the Dalit 
movement I thus had to make personal contacts with people participating in the 
movement. My very first acquaintances were a catholic priest involved in an organisation 
of Christian Dalits, so-called Dalit Christians, and a sociology lecturer, who had earlier 
participated in the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti (DSS); both were men, whom my supervisor, 
Stig Toft Madsen, had coincidentally met at a conference in Germany a couple of months 
before. Moreover, I contacted a leader of a small Bangalore-based NGO who was widely 
known for her involvement in the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR). 
Through these first acquaintances I got the names and telephone numbers of more Dalit 
movement activists and they usually again suggested me new persons to contact. This 
way I gradually established a network of informants – or more correctly: I myself 
became part of some of the existing networks that constitute the Dalit movement.10 
In the beginning, most of my informants were present or former leaders and 
activists from the large leading Dalit organisations in Karnataka. Now in their forties and 
fifties, many of these people – all of them men – had participated in the Dalit movement 
since the 1970s and thus had decades of experience with Dalit activism. They were 
generally easy for me to interview and discuss with since they were mostly well educated 
                                                                                                                                    
framework of a social movement together with an indefinite number of other organisations, 
groups and individuals. Like the Dalit movement at large, the organisations participating in the 
Dalit movement in most cases have blurred boundaries and an uncertain and fluctuating number 
of members or followers. However, most organisations forming part of the Dalit movement 
distinguish themselves by having formal organisational structures, usually with an elected, (self-) 
appointed, or employed leader and a supplementary number of elected, appointed, or employed 
office bearers. 
9 Since my fieldwork in 2002/2003, a few of the Dalit movement actors that I studied have made 
homepages on the internet. For instance the forthnightly journal Dalit Voice has had a homepage 
since 2004 (http://www.dalitvoice.org), while the national party Bahujan Samaj Party got a 
homepage in 2009 (http://www.bspindia.org).   
10 Initially and throughout the fieldwork, I also received much help from the always-helpful staff 
at the Indian Social Institute in Bangalore (ISI), a Jesuit run research and educational centre, 
which among many other activities conducts training camps and courses for Dalit activists from 
all over South India. See http://www.isiblr.org 
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and having a very good command of English.11 Having discussed issues of caste, identity 
and politics throughout their adult life, the experienced activists could often easily relate 
to my initially rather abstract and theoretical questions about Dalit identity and political 
ideology and they often engaged themselves in lengthy theoretical discussions with me. 
As the fieldwork progressed and I became more familiar with the Dalit movement, 
however, I increasingly made acquaintances with the often less politically eloquent rank-
and-file activists and casual sympathisers of the movement, who had just turned up for a 
particular demonstration or meeting. Moreover, I got to know the younger activists of a 
number of new Dalit organisations and students groups, who often had a completely 
different perspective on Dalit politics, embedded in contemporary everyday experience 
or relating to an altogether different theoretical understanding of caste and identity, 
inspired for instance by a post-structuralist, Foucaultian way of theorising power and 
identity.  
I thus moved in a field populated by both experienced activists and political 
novices, belonging to the educated middle class as well as to the uneducated poor – and 
not least to the growing class of educated poor. The informants of my study are thus 
evidence of the vast heterogeneity which characterises the participants in the Dalit 
movement in Karnataka. On one point, however, the informants were amazingly alike: 
they were almost all men, as are the great majority of people participating in the Dalit 
movement. Male leaders generally even dominated organisations – mostly NGOs – that 
had an explicit focus on Dalit women’s rights and in the broader parts of the Dalit 
movement, gender was barely discussed. My informants’ perspectives on caste, identity 
and caste-based oppression were therefore mostly male perspectives and when the 
question of Dalit identity came up in discussion, it was almost invariably a male identity 
that ‘Dalit’ was supposed to refer to. For me as a fieldworker, however, the gender bias 
of the Dalit movement was mostly a matter of fact, which did not pose any methodical 
challenges to the study. 
Throughout the fieldwork I tried to participate in as many – and as many 
different – political and cultural activities of the Dalit movement as possible. I thus 
participated in anything from small semi-private meetings and social get-togethers to 
                                                 
11The ‘working language’ of the Dalit movement in Karnataka was Kannada, which is the official 
language of the state and the first language of the majority of the activists in the Dalit movement. 
While most of the leaders and educated activists in Bangalore spoke English – broken or fluid –
many activists from the villages and urban slums spoke only a few words of English. During my 
stay in Karnataka, I took Kannada classes twice a week and about halfway through the fieldwork I 
was capable of conducting simple conversations with Kannada-speaking activists. I attempted a 
few times to work with hired interpreters, but it did not work out well. Instead, I usually relied on 
interpretation from other activists in the group or organisation, who had a better command of 
English or I asked the help of family members or neighbours of the activists, if I visited them at 
home – or simply tried to make the most of my broken Kannada.  
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large protest rallies and dharnas12 in front of government buildings and police offices 
with thousands or ten thousands of participants. In these situations, I often took up casual 
conversations with rank-and-file activists or followers and sympathisers of the different 
organisations and sometimes arranged a subsequent meeting with them to make a more 
formal interview. Methodically, I thus constantly combined participant observation, 
conversation, discussions and interviews. In fact, the different methods were always 
somehow overlapping since observation and participation always is part of the interview 
situation, and participant observation in social settings usually involves a great deal of 
verbal interaction with the (observed) actors of the field.  
 
Political involvement and analytical distance 
Since political discussion is one of the principal activities of the activists in the Dalit 
movement, doing participant-observation in the movement necessarily included taking 
part in the ongoing debate. Throughout the fieldwork, I was constantly asked about my 
views on Dalit politics and requested to take a personal stand on current affairs and to 
participate actively in the discussions at political meetings and seminars.13 Thus, I had to 
invest my own political viewpoints in my encounter with the activists, even though my 
academic ideals told me to stay impartial and balanced in relation to internal conflicts in 
the field. Like many other social movement scholars I, myself, had been involved in 
other types of social movement politics  and my initial choice of the Dalit movement as a 
field of research was also, at least partially, politically motivated (cf. Meyer 2002: 7). 
Yet, I worried that stating my own political views and sympathies might alienate some 
informants and that I would not be able to keep the sufficient analytical distance to the 
empirical data that I was producing. In the beginning, I therefore often tried to answer in 
a reflective, academic way, when I was asked about my personal opinion in relation to 
politically controversial subjects. However, I soon realised that many activists promptly 
lost interest in me if I refused to take a clear stand. To stay included in the network of 
Dalit movement activists, I had to speak my mind and so I cautiously engaged in 
discussing Dalit politics.  
In fact, political discussions turned out to be an invaluable source of 
knowledge, because my scepticism or downright opposition tended to sharpen the 
arguments of my informants, while I, myself, on the other hand, started questioning my 
own convictions. Through political discussions, I learned to understand and appreciate 
                                                 
12 A dharna is an Indian type of sit-down protest, where protesters sit in front of government 
offices or their political adversaries’ homes or offices to press for their rights or interests. 
13 Eva-Maria Hardtmann (2003) describes similar experiences in her study of the Dalit movement. 
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diametrically oppositional views and arguments about caste and identity and about what 
should be the political visions and strategies of the Dalit movement. As I became more 
familiar with the different, conflicting political views in the movement, I many times 
simply played the devil’s advocate during interviews to better understand the viewpoints 
of the particular activist(s). At the end of the fieldwork, I had come to the point where I 
was actually no longer able to take sides, but could easily understand and appreciate 
various different political positions in the movement. Contrary to my expectations, my 
political involvement in the field thus ended up facilitating an analytical distance to the 
internal disagreements of the Dalit movement and made me aware of the profound 
strategic and emotional dilemmas related to the politicisation of Dalit identity.  
The altogether eleven months fieldwork resulted in a comprehensive body of 
ethnographic data of which only a few bits and pieces will be presented directly in the 
thesis. However, the analyses and arguments are informed and supported by a much 
larger material.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MAKING OF THE UNTOUCHABLES AND THE 
POLITICISATION OF CASTE  
 
The notion of ‘untouchable’ castes is today so ingrained in common and scholarly 
thinking about Indian society that many scholars take their unity for granted, even when 
discussing the contemporary splits and contradictions of the Dalit movement in different 
parts of India (e.g., Gorringe 2005b;  Guru and Chakravarthy 2005; Hardtmann 2003). 
However, the idea that the lowest strata in the Hindu social hierarchy of castes 
constitutes a unified, coherent group of people who share the same social position, the 
same grievances and interests and to a large extent even the same identity, is little more 
than hundred years old. 
The analysis of the increased political split of the Dalit movement in Karnataka 
sets out by exploring how the social category of ‘Untouchables’ has been constructed, 
politicised and institutionalised in the course of the 19th century as part of the overall 
processes of democratisation and modernisation in pre- and post-colonial India. 
 
The emergence of the Untouchables 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Holeyas, Madigas, Mahars, Bhambis, Chaluvadis, 
Samagaras, Korammas, Korachas, Bhovis and numerous other low ranking castes living 
in the area that today constitutes the state of Karnataka did not go under a common name 
or think of themselves as belonging to one and the same group of people. With separate 
identities, occupational specialisations and ritual obligations they constituted a highly 
heterogeneous section of the population and did not have much else in common than 
their similar feudal, dependency relations with landowning patrons in addition to the fact 
that higher-ranking Hindu castes considered most of them to be so ritually polluting that 
all physical contact had to be avoided. In the course of barely seventy years, however, 
they were to be categorised first as ‘Outcastes’, ‘Panchamas’, ‘Depressed Classes’ and 
‘Exterior Castes’, then as ‘Untouchables’ and ‘Harijans’, before finally being officially 
classified as ‘Scheduled Castes’ in the Government of India Act in 1935 (Charsley 
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1996).14 Significantly, these generic names were ascribed to the economically weakest 
and socially lowest ranking castes in the society by civil servants, politicians and social 
reformers for purposes of administration and control, as well as for the social uplift and 
political mobilisation of the categorised (Charsley and Karanth 1998: 20). The initial 
formation and delineation of a common identity for the large cluster of castes today 
known as either Scheduled Castes or Dalits did thus not arise from within the low castes 
themselves; it was ascribed to them by others. As I shall argue, the formation of a 
collective identity of Untouchables and later Scheduled Castes and Dalits provided a 
strong platform for the political mobilisation of the so labelled castes in independent 
India, but it also deliberately ignored the differences and distinctive cultural resources of 
the many castes or jatis thrown together under these labels.   
One of the single most important factors in the making of a universal Indian 
category of degraded and despised castes at the bottom of the social hierarchy was the 
decennial census of India, which was initiated by the British colonial administration in 
1871-7215. From the outset the census was commissioned to rank the numerous Indian 
castes according to their supposed social precedence and great efforts were made to 
develop a uniform, all India scheme of hierarchical classification (Charsley 1996; Dirks 
2002).  
At the time of the first census, the term Depressed Classes was gaining ground 
among Indian intellectuals and social reformers, who found that something had to be 
done to better the situation of the lowest ranking, poor and socially deprived castes 
(Charsley and Karanth 1998: 21). However, it was not ‘Depressed Classes’, but the term 
‘Outcaste’, which was used in the first census to designate the lowest of altogether five 
identified strata of the Hindu population. The census thereby adopted the ancient 
cosmological scheme, varnasharma dharma, of the pre-Hindu Vedic scriptures, which 
divides humankind into four hierarchically ordered varnas, or social categories, of 
respectively Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants) and 
Shudras (labourers), plus sometimes an additional fifth category of Chandalas or 
‘outcasts’ expelled from the first four categories. It was thus a religious model of Indian 
                                                 
14 On scrutiny, however, Charsley and Karanth remark, the long equation of terms is far from 
unproblematic, since each of the terms has emerged within a particular context of use, while there 
is no established relationship between them. Many of the terms listed as synonyms for the same 
social strata do therefore in fact denote differently defined, albeit largely overlapping, groups of 
people (1998: 20). For this reason, the exact definition of ’Dalit’ in relation to the categories of 
’Untouchables’ and ’Scheduled Castes’ has been a recurrent theme of contestation in the Dalit 
movement since its inception, as it will appear in the following chapters of the thesis.  
15 The first census of India, which is usually referred to as the census of 1871-72,  was conducted 
rather unsystematically in different parts of India in the period between 1867 and 1872 (GoI 
2010-11). Because of its obvious flaws, this first census has never attained the same status as the 
subsequent decennial censuses (Dirks 2002: 200).   
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society that was used to classify and rank the myriad of contemporary individual castes 
or jatis in the subcontinent, and a model that privileged the Brahminical elite’s 
understanding of caste as a divine hierarchy in which they themselves happened to be on 
top. The census’ embracement of the varna scheme meant that the social institution of 
caste was defined as a purely religious phenomenon and an essential part of Hinduism. 16 
In the beginning of the 1900s, the term ‘untouchable’ and the related concept of 
untouchability crept into the language of politicians and social reformers as an 
alternative to the many shifting classificatory terms designating the lowest social strata 
among the Hindus. At a social conference in 1903 in the city of Dharwar, in what is 
presently northern Karnataka, the Congress leader, G. K. Gokhale rhetorically stated, 
‘We may touch a cat, we may touch a dog, we may touch any other animal, but the touch 
of these human beings is pollution’ (Gokhale 1920 in Charsley 1996: 6). It was thus the 
attitude of higher castes, notably Brahmins, towards the group, which from now on 
increasingly was referred to as ‘Untouchables’ that was defining for the new identity 
label. In the course of a decade, a number of organisations were formed in different parts 
of India for the social uplift of the ‘Untouchables’ and the question of religiously 
sanctioned discriminatory practices, so-called untouchability, occupied a central role for 
the high caste reformers engaged in the cause (Charsley 1996: 6pp). A new powerful 
identity category had thus been established for the uplift of a population group, who did 
still not themselves identify with this or with any of the other terms of the nomenclature 
invented for their designation. 
  
Anti-Brahminism and the ethnicisation of caste 
Concurrent with the British colonial administration’s efforts to map and classify castes as 
clearly bounded, socially ranked entities, castes from all over the country began to form 
caste associations to pressurise for a higher and more honourable status in the census. 
This development has by social scientists been defined as a process of ethnicisation or 
substantialisation, in which the ambiguity and fluidity of caste was replaced by sharp 
                                                 
16 However, the varna scheme corresponded badly with the actual social stratification in most 
parts of the country, not least South India, where the Brahminical castes made up barely four per 
cent of the population and where hardly any castes could be identified as belonging to either the 
Kshatriya or the Vaishya category (Dirks 2002: 204). In fact, even the task of identifying singular 
castes on the ground proved to be a problem for the census-takers, since the localised basis of 
endogamous groups meant that caste names varied from place to place and that boundaries 
between different groups were not firmly established. What was regarded as a caste or jati in one 
place would be considered a sub-division or a clan in another place (Charsley 1996: 3). Contrary 
to the simplicity of the textual varna scheme, actual caste identities thus proved to be overlapping, 
unstable, and contested (Dirks 2002: 44).  
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boundaries and a new level of internal organisation (Jaffrelot 2000; Reddy 2005; 
Srinivas 2010). In other words, castes, and in particular larger, numerically dominant 
castes, gradually turned into self-conscious political actors that defined themselves in 
terms of their outer boundaries and distinctive cultural identities.17  
The ethnicisation and substantialisation of caste was further spurred by the 
popularisation of the ‘Aryan invasion theory’ in the 19th century that claimed that the 
linguistic differences between the speakers of Indo-Aryan languages in north India and 
the speakers of Dravidian languages in south India was the result of a mass immigration 
(or invasion) of Aryans about 1500 B.C., who had gradually come to dominate north 
India and forced the Dravidians to the south (Fosse 2000). The Aryans were believed to 
constitute the three upper varnas of Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas described in the 
Vedas, while the Shudras were believed to be the indigenous Dravidian-speaking 
inhabitants of India who had been defeated and suppressed by the foreign Aryan 
invaders. While the Aryan invasion theory was originally formulated by western 
scholars, it was readily taken up by a number of social reformers and low caste 
politicians in the 19th and 20th century, among them Jotirao Phule18, Periyar19 and later 
B.R. Ambedkar20, to explain the depressed state of the low and ‘untouchable’ castes.  
Parallel with the official interpretation of caste as a rigid status hierarchy 
integrating the entire Hindu population, caste was interpreted and practised as an 
expression of deep-seated difference and as political entities competing for power, status 
and privileges. The two very different interpretations – and the tension between them – 
have significantly shaped the politicisation of caste and untouchability up until today, not 
least in the Dalit movement as it will become evident from the following chapters.  
                                                 
17 Caste associations played the role of interest groups in relation to the state and also served as 
mutual aid structures that founded schools and hostels for the caste’s children and created co-
operative movements (Jaffrelot 2000: 758). Moreover, caste associations often forged the unity 
between a number of smaller castes and sub-castes, which began to identify with a common caste 
name in the census and to marry across caste barriers thus creating larger caste communities with 
more bargaining power in relation to the state. The ‘untouchable’ castes, however, did generally 
not have the resources to form caste associations and as a group remained split and unorganised. 
18 Jotirao Phule (1827-1890) was an Indian social reformer and educationalist from what was then 
Bombay Presidency (nowadays Maharashtra), who fought for the social and economic uplift of 
the Shudras and Ati-Shudras (the latter was Phule’s own term for the category of people that was 
later to become known as ’Untouchables’) (cf. Deshpande 2002).  
19 E.V. Ramasamy ’Periyar’ (1879-1973) was a Tamil nationalist social reformer and politician, 
who led the anti-Brahminical movement in Tamil Nadu from the 1920s and fought against north 
Indian dominance of South India after Independence. 
20 Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956) was a U.S. and British-educated lawyer, writer and 
politician from the ’untouchable’ Mahar caste in the Central Provinces (today’s Madhya Pradesh), 
who from the mid-1920s strongly engaged himself in the struggle for the rights of the 
’untouchable’ castes and later became the law minister in the first Indian government and drafted 
the Indian constitution. Today B.R. Ambedkar or Babasaheb as he is affectionately called enjoys 
an iconic status in the Indian Dalit movement. For biographies of B.R. Ambedkar see e.g., Keer 
(2002) and Rodrigues (2003). 
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B.R. Ambedkar and the politicisation of ‘untouchability’  
In the decades leading up to the Indian Independence in 1947, the cause of the 
‘Untouchables’ or Depressed Classes was increasingly politicised and debated and with 
that also the very institution of caste, which was seen as a natural part of Indian society 
by some and as a system of ‘graded inequality’  and a hindrance to democracy by others. 
The most popular champion of the Untouchables’ rights of all times, B.R. 
Ambedkar, was himself torn between the two different interpretations of caste 
throughout his political life and between the wish to completely abolish caste and the 
wish to strengthen the ‘untouchable’ castes politically, economically and socially 
(Rodrigues 2006). On the one hand, he agitated for the abolition of untouchability and 
the eradication of caste (cf. Ambedkar 2003[1936]), on the other hand, he fought with 
the British for ’separate electoral constituencies’ for the ‘Depressed Classes’ at the round 
table conferences in the 1930s and formed political parties21 to mobilise the 
‘untouchable’ castes jointly in parliamentary politics. Ambedkar’s political thinking and 
activism was thus profoundly marked by the ’the dilemma of stigmatized identities’ 
(Jasper 2010), as he continuously attempted to mobilise and unite the ‘untouchable’ 
castes for whose sake he wanted caste to be annihilated – and thus in a sense contributed 
to the strengthening of caste identities, though he struggled to eradicate them.  
Ambedkar’s understanding of caste as a social institution was equally muddled, 
as he on the one hand perceived caste as a religiously instituted hierarchy of ’graded 
inequality’ and on the other hand, described the emergence of caste in India as a result of 
the historic clashes between invaded (Aryan) Hindus and the original, Buddhist 
inhabitants of India.22 However, Ambedkar did never attempt to rehabilitate any original 
elements of the ‘untouchable’ castes’ cultural heritage. Quite the contrary, he urged 
people from the ‘untouchable’ castes to stop performing their traditional ‘polluting’ 
duties, to dress nicely, and give up the widespread habits of eating beef and drinking 
alcohol as a means of self-respect and dignity.  
Late in his life, Ambedkar became convinced that the ’untouchable’ castes had 
to pursue a separate, independent identity for themselves and that they could not be 
liberated without actively renouncing Hinduism. Shortly before his death in 1956, 
                                                 
21 B.R. Ambedkar formed the Independent Labour Party in 1936, the All India Scheduled Caste 
Federation (SCF) in 1942, and the Republican Party of India (RPI) in 1956.  
22According to Charsley (2010), Ambedkar understood caste as an ideology of the self-proclaimed 
high castes that used it as an instrument for imposing dependent inferiority on the Shudras and 
‘Untouchables’. However, it was his immediate concern was to create a common culturally 
distinctive category of ‘Untouchables’ for whom he could fashion a common history. Ambedkar 
thus supported the idea of a unified ‘untouchable’ population, despite the obvious lack of 
homogeneity among the castes so labelled. 
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Ambedkar therefore converted to Buddhism at a mass ceremony in the city of Nagpur 
together with hundred thousands of his followers.   
 
The institutionalisation of caste in independent India 
After Independence, the constitution of India made the practice of untouchability a 
criminal offence and identified a number of ‘Scheduled Castes’ and ‘Scheduled Tribes’ 
in each state that were eligible to certain privileges of positive discrimination, commonly 
known as ‘reservation’ in higher education, political representation, and government 
employment proportional to their numerical representation in the general population. 
Thereby, the castes and communities that had been classified as ‘tribals’23 and 
‘Untouchables’ in the course of the past century plus an additional number of castes that 
were perceived to have a comparable history of social and economic deprivation, were 
acknowledged to need special protection to come on par with the rest of the Indian 
population.24 
Initially, the national reservation policies were only planned to last for ten 
years, but the system of reservation has been extended every ten years ever since, as the 
decennial census and other statistics reveal that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes according to almost all socio-economic indicators continue to lag considerably 
behind the national average. In addition to the national reservation policies, the 
Scheduled Caste population was made the target of numerous welfare programmes e.g., 
vocational training, irrigation projects, and housing schemes that made the classification 
of Scheduled Caste attractive and created large constituencies with interests in 
maintaining the system. Thereby, the reservation policies contributed to the 
reinforcement of caste, even though they were meant to level the differences (Charsley 
1996; Guru & Chakravarty 2005).  
 In 1990, the reservation system was further extended to the social category of 
‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBCs) that roughly corresponded to the Shudra category of 
the varna classification scheme. Now encompassing the majority of the Indian 
population, the national reservation policies no longer seemed as a provisional measure 
                                                 
23 For a critique of the notion of ‘tribal’ communities in India see e.g., Béteille (1986) and Skaria 
(1997). 
24 Just like the earlier national census categories of ‘outcastes’, ‘depressed classes’ and ‘exterior 
castes’ the Scheduled Caste category was restricted to Hindus and Buddhists. Christians 
belonging to the ‘untouchable’ castes, so-called Dalit Christians, who generally suffered 
discrimination and social and economic marginalisation to the same extent as their Hindu caste 
fellows (Deliége 2001; Jacob 2002; Japhet 1987), were thus not encompassed by the reservation 
policies.  
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to rectify the wrongs of the past. Rather, reservation had become a vital part of Indian 
democracy where the relative representation of individual castes in education, public 
employment had become an important measure of social justice.  
 
The Scheduled Castes in contemporary Karnataka 
Despite the obvious political strength of the umbrella categories of ‘untouchable’ castes 
and Scheduled Castes, these categories have not replaced the more complex and 
localised caste identities that continue to exist in rural as well as urban environments in 
Karnataka (Charsley & Karanth 1998). Rather, as the Indian sociologist M.N. Srinivas 
(1996) has suggested, castes have become ‘elastic bodies’ whose actual sizes vary with 
the context, the groups being smaller for endogamy than for claiming political rights and 
reservations. 
According to the census of 2001, 8.6 million people or about 16 per cent of the 
totally 53 million inhabitants of Karnataka belong to the Scheduled Castes (GoK 2006: 
211). The large majority of the Scheduled Castes belong to the two major ‘untouchable’ 
castes of Holeyas and Madigas25, but the list of Scheduled Castes in Karnataka has no 
less than 101 entries many of them amalgamating two, three caste names or more, 
reflecting the vast heterogeneity of the Scheduled Castes in the state.26 
In the early 2000s, the overall social and economic of situation of the 
Scheduled Castes in Karnataka was characterised by a striking combination of 
undeniable social progress and bleak deprivation. Compared with the situation in the 
beginning of the 1970s, when the Dalit movement emerged, the Scheduled Castes in the 
state had experienced significant progress in the areas of education, public employment, 
health, and democratic participation. Moreover and maybe most importantly, there had 
been a gradual relaxation of the practices of untouchability, simultaneous with the 
emergence of a new self-consciousness among particularly the younger generations of 
                                                 
25 The Holeyas and the Madigas are also sometimes known by the designations Balagai and 
Edagai, literally meaning ’right-hand’ and ’left-hand’, respectively. These names refer to the 
bifurcation between agricultural and artisan castes, which in the 18th century encompassed all 
castes from Brahmins to ‘Untouchables’ in South India (Charsley & Karanth 1998; Brimnes 
1999). Today, however, only the ‘untouchable’ castes are divided by this bifurcation. 
26 About 22 per cent26 of the Scheduled Caste population in Karnataka belong to the so-called 
‘touchable’ castes that have traditionally not been considered as ritually polluting by higher 
castes, but nonetheless rank very low in the social hierarchy. Compared to the ‘untouchable’ 
castes, these castes have an altogether different social and cultural history and have generally not 
formed part of the feudal patron-client relationships that have been so characteristic of  the 
‘untouchable’ castes’ situation or been assigned with specific hereditary duties by the village 
communities. Despite their lowliness and deprivation, the Bhovis, Lambanis, and other 
‘touchable’ Scheduled Castes are thus having a quite different social position than the 
‘untouchable’ castes in the state.     
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the Scheduled Castes, who were now less willing to tolerate discrimination or abuse 
tacitly. However, the Scheduled Castes in Karnataka were still lacking far behind the 
general population socially, educationally, and economically (cf. Charsley and Karanth 
1998; GoK 2006).  
Despite the overall progress, there were still many villages in the early 2000s 
where the ‘untouchable’ castes were subject to practices of untouchability, such as two-
tumbler system at the teahouses27, not having access to common wells and not being able 
to sit down in the company of higher caste people. Compared to the situation thirty or 
forty years ago, however, the extent and degree of oppression and discrimination had 
considerably decreased. Many of the first generation Dalit activists, who were in their 
forties and fifties during my fieldwork, had themselves had to sit on the veranda outside 
the classroom during their primary school years and to drink water dripping from a 
bamboo stick, which their class mates held over their cupped hands, not being allowed to 
take water directly from the common water pot like the other children. At the turn of the 
century, such practices were unthinkable, even in the most remote villages, even though 
the situation differed considerably from place to place (Charsley & Karanth 1998).28  
While traditional practices of untouchability were – slowly but surely – 
disappearing, caste-motivated violence against people from the ‘untouchable’ castes, 
commonly known as ‘atrocities’, were on the rise in the 2000s (Frontline 2006). One of 
the most gruesome incidences took place in Karnataka in 2000, when seven persons from 
the Holeya caste were burnt to death by the dominant castes in the village of 
Kambalapalli (Assadi & Rajendran 2000). 29 Hostilities against the ‘untouchable’ castes 
were thus no longer referring to the religious principles of purity and pollution, but 
expressed in the idiom of communalism with the upper castes attempting to retain their 
dominance over the ‘untouchable’ castes through intimidations and violent attacks. The 
relation between the upper, dominating castes and the ‘untouchable’ castes was thus 
gradually shifting from a predominantly hierarchical relation to a relation of communal 
conflict and competition.  
                                                 
27 Traditionally, people from the ‘untouchable’ castes were served tea and coffee in separate 
glasses outside the teashops (which they were banned from entering) because of their alleged 
polluting nature. 
28 In the mid-1990s, a research team headed by the sociologists/social anthropologists Simon 
Charsley and G.K. Karanth carried out detailed ethnographic studies of seven rural ”former 
untouchable” communities in Karnataka. The study showed that the overall caste structures in 
Karnataka vary from region to region and that the status of individual caste communities varies 
immensely from district to district and even from village to village (Charsley and Karanth 1998).  
29 Other examples of atrocities committed against Scheduled Caste communities include murders, 
pollution of wells, and the forcing of victims to eat human excreta as punishment or revenge for 
challenging traditional inhibitions on the ‘untouchable’ castes (cf. Frontline 2006). 
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While the hierarchical dimensions of caste were clearly on the decline in the 
early 2000s, the cultural dimensions of caste were still thriving. Thus, segregated 
habitation was still the norm in rural Karnataka, with each caste living in a separate street 
or parts of the villages. In many places, the ‘untouchable’ castes lived in separate 
settlements, called as keeris or colonies situated outside or adjacent to the main villages 
or oorus; thus physically marking the distance and difference between higher castes and 
lower castes.30 Most places, it was highly un-common for higher castes to allow people 
from the ‘untouchable’ castes inside their houses, but also people from the ‘untouchable’ 
castes themselves did generally not socialise with each other or enter into each other’s 
houses. Inter-caste marriages between people from different Scheduled Castes, not to 
mention between Scheduled Castes and other castes, were also extremely rare in the rural 
areas and severely discouraged by all communities. Caste thus played a major role in the 
regulation of social intercourse in rural Karnataka and the principle of social segregation 
was generally accepted by all the rural communities, including the Scheduled Castes. 
(Cf. Charsley & Karanth 1998). 
In the urban areas, where about twenty-five per cent of the Scheduled Caste 
population lived according to the 2001 census, the situation was markedly different. 
Because of the anonymity of the urban environment, caste was usually not a factor in 
daily interaction between people in the streets, busses, markets, or workplaces, but was 
looked upon as a personal matter related to religious traditions, food choices, marriage, 
and family ties. Practising caste was by many urbanites considered an obsolete and 
uncivilised feature of the past and generally traditional forms of untouchability were not 
practiced in the towns and cities. When Scheduled Caste street sweepers and garbage 
collectors were served in separate glasses and asked to stay outside the teahouses, it was 
thus often explained as a measure of hygiene and not as a measure of caste segregation. 
Overt forms of caste-based discrimination were thus relatively rare in the urban areas, 
but subtle and hidden forms of discrimination were still common, causing many 
Scheduled Caste people to try to hide their caste identity from their neighbours, 
schoolmates, and colleagues.  
While the majority of urban Scheduled Caste members live in poverty, the 
towns and cities in Karnataka are also home to the growing number of people from the 
Scheduled Castes, who have attained middle class status through education and 
                                                 
30 The distinction between ooru and keeri is particularly typical of the southern, ’Old Mysore’ part 
of Karnataka. In northern Karnataka, the ‘untouchable’ castes usually have their quarters inside 
the villages, underscoring that the local practices of caste are not determined by a uniform 
ideology or system, but are deeply embedded in the social relations of local society (Charsley and 
Karanth 1998). 
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employment secured by the national reservation policies. With an increasing number of 
doctors, engineers, university lecturers, police officers and government administrators 
hailing from the Scheduled Castes, class differences within the Scheduled Caste category 
have increased considerably over the past fifty years and contributed to further social 
differentiation among the Scheduled Castes (Jeffrey 2001). People from the Scheduled 
Castes are thus not only divided by cultural, regional, linguistic, and religious 
differences, but also by economic differences, which mean that they as a group have 
increasingly different political interests and priorities. Scheduled Caste identity is in 
other words not constitutive of a coherent political constituency, even though this is still 
the way that it is presented by large parts of the Dalit movement.  
 
Summary  
In this chapter, I have described how the social category of ‘Untouchables’ was created 
as part of the political and administrative processes in which caste was established both 
as an ancient religious hierarchy of ‘graded in-equality’ based on the ritual opposition of 
purity and pollution and as the expression of essential ethno-cultural differences reaching 
back to the Aryan invasion 1500 B.C.  In the course of a century, caste was thus rigidly 
ordered and reified as a universal Indian system of unambiguous, endogamous groups, 
which could be neatly classified into larger major categories of which the ‘Untouchables’ 
or Scheduled Castes was the hierarchically lowest. The category of ‘Untouchables’ or 
Scheduled Castes thus attained the status of an all-India class of oppressed people with 
few other characteristics than their degraded status.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DALIT STRUGGLE IN KARNATAKA AND THE CHANGING 
DISCOURSES OF INDIAN POLITICS 
 
‘The 1960s and 70s was the age of Dalits and Shudras. Even Nehru and Indira 
Gandhi were socialists. Now for the past ten years, the Hindutva wave is sweeping 
this country and the Dalit movement is neither dead nor alive.’ 
Siddaraju, bank officer, activist in the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti in the 1980s and 
1990s 
 
‘The awareness of the Dalits is the greatest achievement of the DSS. Everybody, 
whether he is educated or uneducated, whether he is a landless labourer, or 
whatever he may be, they have got that awareness.’ 
Indudhara Honnapura writer and journalist, co-founder of the Dalit Sangharsh 
Samiti 
 
 
This chapter recounts the history of the Dalit movement in Karnataka from its emergence 
in the early-mid 1970s up until the early 2000s and examines how the identity of Dalit 
has been interpreted and negotiated in relation to the changing and still more 
differentiated and contradictory political agendas of the movement.  
 
From redistribution to recognition? 
Writing on the overall history and development of the Dalit movement in India, the 
political scientists Gopal Guru and Anuradha Chakravarty (2005) argue that the priorities 
of the Dalit movement have gradually changed from the 1970s to the 2000s with issues 
of class and poverty being increasingly downplayed and replaced by what they term as a 
politics of identity formation. Guru and Chakravarty consider this development 
detrimental to the interests of the vast deprived and impoverished majority of the 
Scheduled Castes for whom the issue of economic security is the most pressing political 
concern and advocate for a renewed focus on poverty alleviation.  
The change of political priorities is not unique to the Dalit movement, but has 
taken place in a number of social movements of stigmatised groups in different parts of 
the world in the course of the 1990s as dominant political discourses have increasingly 
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turned from framing social conflicts as struggles of class to framing them as conflicts 
over cultural identity (Fraser 1995, 2000).31 The American political philosopher, Nancy 
Fraser, thus speaks of a general shift from a politics of redistribution to a politics of 
recognition in the wake of the downfall of state communism in Eastern Europe and the 
acceleration of economic globalisation (Fraser 1995).  
As this chapter will show, the case of the Dalit movement in Karnataka on the 
whole supports Guru and Chakravarty’s argument about issues of class and economic 
development having increasingly lost their significance in Dalit politics. However, the 
study also indicates that the suggested dichotomy between economic politics and identity 
politics is oversimplified and even misleading as it reduces politics of identity to a 
question of cultural recognition and deliberately ignores the identity aspect of anti-caste 
struggle. In contrast, I shall argue that the contemporary dilemmas associated with 
politicising Dalit identity have actually made themselves felt right since the beginning of 
the movement, though they have gradually intensified and crystallised in response to the 
wider, comprehensive changes of national and state politics during the late 1980s and 
1990s. 
 
The Bhim Sena: A separatist vision for the Dalits 
Arguably, the Dalit movement in Karnataka (even in all of India) set off in 1968 with the 
launch of the militant, separatist organisation Bhim Sena in Gulbarga district in North 
Karnataka (Omvedt 1994: 336; Shetty 1978).32 This organisation was founded by B. 
Shyam Sunder (1908-1975), a Scheduled Caste leader, writer and politician, who had 
been involved in the struggle for the rights of the Scheduled Castes since the early 1940s. 
The name Bhim Sena literally meaning ‘Bhim’s Army’ referred to B.R. Ambedkar’s first 
name Bhimrao and indicated a strong adherence to Ambedkar’s philosophy. Bhim Sena 
was launched to confront the increasing number of upper caste assaults on Scheduled 
Caste communities militarily, and thousands of young men in the northern districts of 
Karnataka and the adjacent districts in the neighbouring states of Maharashtra and 
                                                 
31 A parallel example is the movement of peasants and indigenous people in Guatemala, which in 
the course of the 1990s gradually shifted its focus from land struggles, economic redistribution, 
and human rights to issues of identity and recognition and turned into a pure Maya movement, 
which increasingly focused on retrieving long since forgotten indigenous traditions and 
resuscitating the ’original’ Maya religion of their ancestors. [My own experience from ’solidarity 
work’ in Nicaragua and Guatemala in the 1990s and 2000s.] 
32 Most scholars and activists do, however, regard the Bhoosa incident in 1973, described below, 
as the starting signal of the Dalit movement in Karnataka (e.g., Japhet 1997).  
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Andhra Pradesh were trained in self-defence by former military servicemen (Shetty 
1978:19). 33  
The struggle of Bhim Sena against the continued oppression of the 
‘untouchable’ castes was, as indicated by the name, construed as a veritable war between 
the Scheduled Castes and the so-called caste Hindus, i.e. Hindus belonging to any of the 
four varnas of the Vedic scriptures. Shyam Sunder held that the Scheduled Castes were 
mool bharathis, ‘original Indians’, and the rulers of the country before the advent of the 
Aryan invaders and that the Scheduled Castes were entirely different from ‘caste Hindus’ 
(Sunder 1965, cited in Shetty 1978:2). Sunder thus bought into the anti-Brahmin, ‘ethnic’ 
discourse on caste describing the ‘untouchable’ castes as the indigenous Indian 
inhabitants. Like Ambedkar34, Sunder demanded separate settlements, a ‘Dalitstan’ for 
the Scheduled Castes, and proposed that twenty-five per cent of the villages in every 
taluk35 was handed over to the Scheduled Castes and the ‘caste Hindus’ relocated in 
other villages and compensated for their losses (ibid.13 pp). Further Sunder demanded 
separate electorates and universities for the Scheduled Castes in each of the Indian states. 
Bhim Sena was thus rooted in a separatist vision of liberation. Freedom for the 
Scheduled Castes was literally interpreted as freedom from the ‘caste Hindus’; social and 
cultural autonomy from the upper castes and the religious ideology of Hinduism being 
the sine qua non for liberation of the Scheduled Castes. 
While the Dalit organisations formed few years later were inspired by Marxist 
class analysis and ultimately aimed at eradicating the very institution of caste, the aim of 
Bhim Sena was essentially to protect the Scheduled Castes and strike back whenever 
they were attacked, not to profoundly revolutionise the whole society or abolish the 
institution of caste. However, the struggle of Bhim Sena was short-lived. The 
organisation disintegrated soon after the death of Shyam Sunder in 1975 and today the 
experience of Bhim Sena is almost forgotten by Dalit activists and scholars. 
Significantly, I never encountered anybody during my research who had participated in 
the organisation, though a few Dalit leaders referred appraisingly to Shyam Sunder as 
                                                 
33 Bhim Sena generally spoke on behalf of the entire group of ‘untouchable’ castes. However, it is 
not clear to me, if Bhim Sena in reality reached out to all young men from the ’untouchable’ 
castes or if it only mobilised participants from a single caste. (Shyam Sunder himself belonged to 
the Telugu right hand caste of Malas often identified with Holeyas in Karnataka).  
34 B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate settlements for the ‘untouchable’ castes on several 
occasions, for instance in the essay ‘What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables’ 
from 1945 (Ambedkar 2008: 343 pp.). However, Ambedkar was not consistent in his statements 
on this subject and on other occasions urged people from the ‘untouchable’ castes to escape 
stigmatisation by moving from the villages to the anonymity of the towns and cities. In all 
occasions, Ambedkar maintained that the ultimate aim of his political struggle was a complete 
eradication of caste (Rodrigues 2003).  
35 A taluk is an administrative unit, smaller than a district and larger than a hubli. 
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‘very militant’. When Bhim Sena is still worth mentioning it is because it shows that 
essentialist and separatist tendencies have actually been influencing the Dalit movement 
since its start, though it is often thought of as a recent phenomenon by scholars and 
activists alike.   
 
The ‘bhoosa incident’ and the emergence of a revolutionary Dalit movement 
It was a completely different ideology that characterised the movement which later came to 
be known nationally and internationally as the broad-based, progressive Dalit movement of 
Karnataka. This movement started out primarily as a literary protest movement of 
revolutionary, young writers, but within few years developed into a mass-movement 
engaged in land struggles, awareness building, protests against discrimination and 
atrocities, and anti-communalist agitation.  
The starting signal for this new movement was by most of the original Dalit 
activists considered to be the so-called bhoosa incident in 1973, when the Congress state 
minister of municipal administration, B. Basavalingappa, in a public speech declared that 
Kannada literature was nothing but bhoosa or ‘cattle-feed’.36 Basavalingappa, who 
himself belonged to the Holeya caste, criticised Kannada literature for reflecting only the 
aesthetics and experiences of the Brahmins and upper castes in its habitual praise of 
Gods and nature, leaving out the voices of the downtrodden, toiling majority, especially 
the ‘untouchables’ (cf. Shetty 1978). The speech caused a major political crisis in 
Karnataka with widespread and violent protests throughout the state. Upper caste youth 
attacked the hostels of Scheduled Caste students and it came to regular clashes and street 
fighting between protesting groups of upper caste youth and Scheduled Caste students, 
who for their part supported Basavalingappa. The crisis caused the forced resignation of 
the state minister, but also ignited the revolutionary spirit among the Scheduled Caste 
youth.37  
At that time, a new political consciousness was already breeding in the 
Scheduled Caste communities with young people getting better educated than the 
previous generation (of which the large majority was illiterate and completely 
                                                 
36 My representation of the Dalit movement’s early history is mainly based on interviews with a 
number of the first generation activists and leaders, including S. Siddalingaiah, Devanoor 
Mahadev, Indudhara Honnapura, and O. Rajanna, who were all elected convenors of DSS in the 
first foundation conference in 1977. For other descriptions and analyses of the early history of the 
Dalit movement in Karnataka, see Japhet (1997), Rodrigues (2010) and Shetty (1978).   
37 B. Basavalingappa was a controversial and provocative political figure, who had many times 
expressed his contempt for upper caste culture and Hindu religion. The ‘bhoosa incident’ was the 
last straw, which forced the Congress chief minister, Devaraj Urs, to dismiss him from office 
(Shetty 1978). 
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uneducated) and being less willing to accept their deprived and depressed status as the 
will of fate. Many villages and urban slums had local Ambedkar sanghas and Ambedkar 
youth organisations (usually single caste enterprises) demonstrating resistance to upper 
caste domination and engaging in local conflicts affecting the Scheduled Castes. In 
Bangalore, an organisation of ‘rationalist students’ mobilised Scheduled Caste college 
students  in the thousands for protest marches and in the industrial town of Bhadravati in 
central Karnataka, a college headmaster, B. Krishnappa, was organising the Scheduled 
Caste workers on the local steel factory against discrimination in the workplace. In 
southern Karnataka, the socialist movement and particularly the youth organisation  
‘Samajwadi Yuvajana Sabha’(SYS) attracted many progressive, young students, writers 
and intellectuals, among them some of the young Scheduled Caste men who were to 
become prominent figures in the first generation of Dalit movement leaders and 
renowned cultural personalities38. Many of them wrote prose and poetry inspired by the 
already flourishing Maharashtrian Dalit literature and by the revolutionary and militant 
Dalit Panthers movement in Maharashtra which had popularised the term ‘Dalit’ as a 
defiant and self-conscious alternative to the popular Gandhian euphemism Harijan 
‘people of God’ that they believed was patronising (cf. Zelliott 2001). The young 
socialist, ‘Dalit writers’ organised meetings and seminars on the condition of the 
Scheduled Castes in Karnataka and published an independent magazine ‘Panchama’ on 
the Scheduled Castes’ experience of caste, culture and oppression.  
The basis of all these activities was a radical egalitarian, socialist and 
rationalist (i.e., anti-Hindu) outlook and a strong opposition to the institution of caste. 
Tellingly, the new Dalit activists did generally not even know each other’s castes and all 
had a markedly anti-communitarian perspective on anti-caste struggle. They were 
inspired by the writings of Karl Marx and by the Indian socialist Rammanohar Lohia39, 
while the writings of B.R. Ambedkar played a less significant role. They used the new 
term ‘Dalit’ in a distinctly non-essentialist way to refer to all those suffering under the 
combined forces of caste and class and to stress the downtrodden, oppressed state of all 
the poor and marginalised. The ‘bhoosa incident’, however, marked a decisive turning 
                                                 
38 Among them the author and winner of the Sahitiya Academy award in Kannada Devanoor 
Mahadeva, poet and former dean at Bangalore University S. Siddalingaiah, writer and journalist 
Indudhara Honnapura and poet and lecturer H. Govindaiah.  
39 Contrary to other Indian socialist thinkers, Rammanohar Lohia (1910-1967) paid direct 
attention to caste, which he considered a congealed form of class that excluded 80 per cent of the 
Indian population (including religious minorities) from public life. Lohia advocated a broad 
political alliance between Scheduled Castes, Shudras, Muslims and Christians against Brahmin 
and upper caste dominance and was a strong proponent of inter-caste marriages as a long-term 
solution to the problem of caste. Compared to the revolutionary ideology of Marxism, 
‘Lohianism’ was reformist and believed that changes could be made within the existing system 
(Gowda 2010; Omvedt 1994; Srinivas & Panini 1984). 
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point for the young, Scheduled Caste writers and activists since most of the upper caste 
members40 of the socialist movement sided unambiguously with their caste fellows in 
demanding the resignation of B. Basavalingappa. After all, even progressive, egalitarian 
socialists, who were proclaimed opponents of caste, could not tolerate a direct attack on 
their cultural heritage in the name of anti-caste struggle. The ‘bhoosa incident’ thus made 
it clear that the chasm between young ‘Dalit’ and upper caste socialists was too wide to 
bridge and that the Scheduled Castes had to organise separately to emancipate 
themselves from upper caste domination. The universalist, socialist ideals of solidarity 
and common identity between all subordinated groups thus proved unable to stand the 
test of practice.  
In the course of the following years, an independent Dalit movement gradually 
formed in Karnataka with the young socialist, Dalit writers and activists as some of the 
prime movers. In 1975, the Dalita Lekaka Kalavida Yuva Sanghatane, ‘Young Dalit 
Writers and Artists Federation’, was formed at a conference in the town of Bhadravathi 
in central Karnataka with the presence of several hundred participants: SC students, 
teachers, peasants, labourers and other interested. At the conference itself, it was decided 
that it was necessary to form a single, state-level Dalit organisation to bring together the 
many disparate Dalit groups41 and promote a broad-based, united struggle to secure the 
cultural, social and economic rights of the Scheduled Castes.  
 
The Dalit Sangharsh Samiti 
In 1977, the first foundational conference of the new organisation ‘Dalit Sangharsh 
Samiti’ (DSS), the Dalit Struggle Committee, was held and from now on the Dalit 
movement in Karnataka gained momentum (cf. Japhet 1997). The leaders of the DSS 
began to tour all over the state, visiting SC communities in all villages and small towns 
to build political awareness and establish local DSS groups. The leaders were usually 
staying in the local SC/ST boys’ hostels where Scheduled Caste students were provided 
free accommodation along with educational scholarships according to the government 
reservation policy for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Through these 
encounters, students were mobilised to the movement and many of them took up 
responsibilities as local leaders or student leaders. In the course of few years, DSS 
                                                 
40 A number of prominent, upper caste members of the socialist movement who were later to 
become renown literary and political personalities, however, supported their SC comrades, among 
them: writer and journalist P. Lankesh; author U. Ananthamurthy; the later farmers movement 
leader M.D. Nanjundaswamy, and writer and scholar D.R. Nagaraj. 
41 By 1975, a number of small Dalit groups and organisations had emerged, including Dalit 
Okkoota Samiti, Dalit Kriya Vedike, Dalit Kriya Samiti, Dalit Action Committee, Dalit 
Sangharsha Samiti, and Dalit Vidhyarthi Okkoota (Japhet 1997; Rodrigues 2010).  
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succeeded in organising Scheduled Caste communities from even the remotest parts of 
Karnataka and the Dalit movement became a political force which together with the 
equally strong farmer’s movement ‘Raitha Sangha’42 came to constitute the effective 
opposition to the alternating Congress and Janata state governments throughout the 
1980s (cf. Rodrigues 2010).  
The DSS took up cases of atrocities committed against SCs mainly in the 
villages and raised protests against the continued practice of bonded labour and against 
nude worship: a yearly Hindu celebration of the goddess Yellamma in which mostly SC 
women were parading naked as part of the ritual.43 However, it was the issue of land that 
dominated the Dalit struggle. The DSS raised a large number of land struggles 
organising landless SC communities to demand land from the government and 
supporting people who were evicted from the land they lived in and cultivated (often 
excess land) or had their land (often government grants) encroached by upper caste 
landlords. The methods of struggle were militant and in many cases included sudden 
occupation (and later cultivation) of disputed areas, hunger strikes and roadblocks. 
Throughout the 1980s, the main focus of the DSS remained linked to the issue of land, 
thus underscoring the importance that the organisation and the majority of the SCs 
attributed to the issues of social inequality and economic change.44  
The 1980s were indeed the heydays of the Dalit movement in Karnataka. The 
DSS was capable of gathering several hundred thousand protesters for its demonstrations 
in Bangalore and was considered a political force to reckon with by politicians and by 
the government authorities. Accordingly, the picture of Ambedkar was installed in 
government offices next to that of Gandhi, a statue of Ambedkar erected in front of the 
state parliament, Vidhana Soudha, and the birthday of Ambedkar, Ambedkar Jayanthi, 
was declared a government holiday. 
While the DSS came into being as part of a radical anti-caste movement, the 
concrete struggle of the organisation aimed at securing the rights and livelihoods of the 
                                                 
42 For an account of the history and politics of Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS), see e.g., 
Assadi (1997). 
43 The DSS succeeded in putting a stop to the yearly, naked parades of SC women, which were 
seen as humiliating and abusive. While many old-time Dalit activists pointed out the stop of nude 
worship as one of DSS’s greatest successes, the Canadian anthropologist Linda Epp (2003) argues 
that DSS’s attitude towards Dalit women parading naked actually represented a powerful 
masculine, middleclass discourse, which was completely insensitive towards local meanings. In 
that respect the DSS conformed to a typical urban, middleclass, upper caste sexual morality, 
which it tried to impose on poor, rural women. While this discussion falls beyond the scope if the 
present thesis, I will, however, in Chapter 5, describe how new Dalit organisations today confront 
the middleclass norms and expectations, which they claim that the DSS represents.  
44 On the whole, however, the land reforms in Karnataka did not profoundly change the 
landowner pattern in the state, which continues to be skewed, particularly in the northern part of 
the state (Deshpande & Torgal 2003).  
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Scheduled Castes and it directly contributed to elucidate the social and economic 
conflicts between the Scheduled Castes and the higher-ranking land owning castes. 
Despite its declared aim of facilitating the abolition of caste, the DSS in practice 
contributed to the strengthening of the collective identity of the Dalits and of the overall 
social and political importance of caste. ‘The dilemma of stigmatized identities’ (Jasper 
2010) that I introduced in the introduction thus made itself felt in the Dalit movement 
right from the start, though it was not much discussed at this stage. In fact, the political 
strategies followed by the DSS were never thoroughly consistent. At one point for 
instance, Rodrigues (2010) points out, the DSS actually supported a politics of separate 
settlement for the Dalits45 and at another point B. Krishnappa, the charismatic, first state 
convenor of the DSS, should even have argued for an armed Dalit struggle. The issue of 
identity and the implicit distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ inherent to the Dalit struggle 
thus gave rise to some ambiguity, even though the DSS on the whole represented a non-
separatist political approach to Dalit liberation. 
Issues of culture and identity played an important role in DSS’s agitation as the 
leaders believed that real social change could only take place through profound cultural 
transformation. The DSS promoted street plays, songs and poetry by the growing number 
of Dalit writers and contributed to the creation of a new independent, Dalit artistic style 
in literature and performing arts that gave voice to the experiences of the Scheduled 
Castes and challenged the moral and aesthetic values of Brahmins and upper castes (cf. 
Nagaraj 1993, 1994; Siddalingaiah 2002). The DSS also promoted traditional drumming 
of the thamate – a flat circular drum made of wood and goat or buffalo hide – as a part of 
their agitation. Playing the thamate is one of the traditional, hereditary village 
occupations of men from the Holeya and Madiga castes and is regarded as a most 
degrading and ritually polluting activity. While the Holeyas and Madigas in the villages 
increasingly refused to play the thamate for festivals and funeral processions to protest 
against the traditional imposition of polluting duties, the DSS, however, moved drum 
playing from the streets to the stage and promoted thamate playing as a traditional Dalit 
art form. Through an inversion of meanings DSS thus used cultural traditions to restore 
the self-respect of the SCs and convert shame and humiliation into to cultural pride. 
Caste identity and traditions were thus not only interpreted as a source of oppression and 
stigmatisation, but also as a cultural resource to be cherished and developed.   
In 1984, the DSS adopted a formal constitution and in some sense turned from 
a loosely structured grassroots movement into a formal organisation with rules to abide 
and a symbol of its own. It was decided democratically that a broom and a pickaxe put 
                                                 
45 Personally, however, I have not come across that information during my fieldwork and I have 
not been able to find any literary sources that confirm this information, either. 
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across as in the communist symbol ‘hammer and sickle’ should serve as the logo of the 
organisation. This way caste and class were projected as related if not conflating 
structures since the broom and pickaxe where considered symbols of the ‘untouchable’ 
castes who have traditionally served as sweepers and agricultural labourers in the village 
societies. The symbol was intended to convey a sense of pride and self-respect. Still, 
some of the DSS members believed that this choice of symbol was entirely wrong. They 
found that the organisation should rather choose a more progressive symbol that did not 
deliberately depict Dalit identity as bound up with the menial and despised jobs they had 
been forced to do by the upper castes. In retrospect, this disagreement may be interpreted 
as a first indication of a burgeoning schism between political demands for personal 
emancipation and cultural recognition as it exposed that the DSS members had 
fundamentally different approaches to the representation of Dalit identity.  
Ideologically, the DSS continued to be inspired by the writings of Marx and 
Lohia, but gradually the writings of Ambedkar gained more influence on the 
organisation’s ideology and practice, which led to an increased focus on issues of e.g., 
personal freedom, fundamental rights and equal citizenship. In that way, DSS combined 
a socialist claim for economic redistribution with a liberal claim for civil rights and 
personal emancipation. The DSS held that a transformation of the society had to come 
from below and strongly believed in the power of grassroots mobilisation while it 
shunned parliamentary politics. The manifesto of DSS was decidedly leftist and placed 
the question of caste exploitation and discrimination in a socialist framework (Rodrigues 
2010).46 In practice, the DSS managed to bridge both class and caste barriers within the 
movement. While the organisation was led by college and university students and 
educated middleclass men, it was mainly concerned with the problems and grievances of 
the rural poor. The great majority of activists and followers of the DSS belonged to the 
Holeyas and Madigas, respectively – and among them the Holeyas by far outnumbered 
the Madigas. Still, the DSS in many districts took up cases of all the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes.  
 
                                                 
46 I have not had the opportunity to read the DSS manifesto, but according to an old-time Dalit 
leader it was a ’left manifesto’ that spoke of ’labour unions and class struggle’ while maintaining 
that caste was the main oppressive factor for the Scheduled Castes. This information is supported 
by Rodrigues (2010) and Japhet (1997). 
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The ‘identity turn’ of Indian politics and the fragmentation of the Dalit 
movement 
In the late 1980s, the political environment in India began to change. The so-called 
Mandal-masjid controversies over the implementation of reservations for OBCs in higher 
education and public sector employment and over the communal right to the site of the 
abandoned north Indian mosque, Babri Masjid, which is also the alleged birth place of 
the Hindu god Ram, put caste and religious identity high on the political agenda. The 
political influence of the rightist Hindu nationalist movement grew rapidly and the 
parliamentary wing of the movement, the ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP), the Indian 
People’s Party, became the primary opposition party in the national parliament.  In fact, 
identity was increasingly used to build electoral constituencies and all over the country 
political parties proclaiming the interests of distinct identity groups, whether religious, 
regional, linguistic or caste-wise, mushroomed. 
In addition to the thorough communalisation of Indian politics in the 1990s, the 
period was marked by a radical change of the economic structure in the country with the 
shift from a state-driven ‘planned’ economy to a thoroughly market-driven economy. 
The new economic policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation adopted by the 
Congress government in 1991 considerably reduced the role of the state and paved the 
road for the later extraordinary high growth rates of the national economy and the 
widening gap between the growing urban middle classes and the rural and urban poor. 
Since the state now increasingly concentrated on servicing private companies and 
facilitating economic growth in the private sector, the Dalit movement could no longer 
direct its demand for livelihood and economic development towards the state (Rodrigues 
2010).  
It is these two parallel developments in Indian politics: the increasing impacts 
of religious nationalism and of economic liberalisation that according to Guru and 
Chakravarty (2005) have led to an overall increased focus on identity formation in the 
Dalit movement and a decreased focus on poverty alleviation and social justice. If we 
accept this analysis, it was as a response to this new political situation that the Dalit 
movement in Karnataka gradually began to change its political priorities. The previous 
demands for inclusion of the Dalits into the mainstream of society had lost their 
liberating potential in the light of the openly communalist agenda of the Hindu 
nationalist movement. As a result, the notion of a distinct Dalit identity and culture was 
gaining ground among the Dalit movement activists and demands for cultural recognition 
started to overshadow the demands for personal emancipation and economic 
development (see Reddy 2005; Guru and Chakravarty 2005).  
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In the middle of the 1980s, the radical left wing of the DSS had left the 
organisation to focus more specifically on class struggle and with the ‘identity turn’ of 
Dalit politics in the 1990s a number of other splinter groups left the organisation to 
mobilise on an alternative basis; among them Christian Dalits, who had never been fully 
accepted as ‘real’ Dalits in the DSS. By the beginning of the 1990s, the DSS was marked 
by exhaustion. In Karnataka, the yearlong celebration of B.R. Ambedkar’s hundred years 
centenary in 1991 marked the conclusion of the DSS’s success, as this was the last time 
that the organisation managed to mobilise the large Dalit masses for demonstrations in 
Bangalore. Over the years, the militancy of the DSS had declined. The land struggles had 
stopped (see Rodrigues 2010) and the DSS had gradually turned into a kind of interest 
organisation that reacted to instances of encroachment, discrimination and atrocities 
against SCs and propagated for the installation of Ambedkar portraits and statues in 
public places to symbolically mark their presence in society. However, the DSS was no 
longer capable of setting its own political agenda. The following years, the process of 
fragmentation and political diversification escalated and brought fundamental internal 
disagreements to the fore, which were to profoundly change the Dalit movement in the 
state.  
Before the state elections in 1994, a branch of the national party, the ‘Bahujan 
Samaj Party’ (BSP), was started in Karnataka and after heated discussions the DSS 
decided to support the BSP in the upcoming state elections. BSP’s ideology of capturing 
parliamentary power for the class of Bahujan Samaj (the great majority), however, 
differed considerably from the principles of the DSS.47 Firstly, the category of Bahujan 
Samaj was perceived to encompass all but the 10-15 per cent so-called ‘twice-born’ 
castes48, including the land owning agricultural castes, and thus included those castes 
that were usually perceived as upper castes by the DSS. Secondly, the aim of the BSP 
was solely to strengthen the position of the suppressed castes, not to radically abolish the 
institution of caste or to change the structures of society profoundly. When the BSP 
joined hands with the BJP to form a coalition government in Uttar Pradesh in 1995, it 
came to a deep split in the DSS between the leaders who wanted to continue the support 
                                                 
47 The BSP was formed in the state of Uttar Pradesh in1984 by the charismatic leader, Kanshi 
Ram, who wanted to continue B.R. Ambedkar’s struggle for empowerment and political 
unification of the ‘untouchable’ castes. The BSP did thus not emanate from the popular Dalit 
movement (Pai 2001: 269), but reflected Kanshi Ram’s personal interpretation of the writings and 
speeches of Ambedkar. Defining the Brahmical castes as the main enemies of the Dalits (ibid. 
271), the ideology of the party differed from that of the original Dalit movement in that it defined 
all non-twice born castes – and even the Christian and Muslim minorities – as oppressed under the 
Brahmins’ political hegemony. The BSP thus wanted to forge a political alliance between the 
Scheduled Castes and their immediate oppressors and competitors, the dominant Shudra castes, in 
Karnataka particularly the Vokkaligas and Lingaiyats.    
48 The term ‘twice-born castes’ denotes castes that are supposed to belong to the three upper 
varnas in the ancient varna scheme: Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishiyas. 
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of the BSP and those who blatantly refused future collaboration. According to the last 
mentioned group, the BSP completely betrayed the fundamental principles of the Dalit 
movement for the sake of power and engaged in a political ‘number play’ that replaced 
ideological conviction with demography and political opportunism. In 1996, accordingly 
the DSS split into two parts over the BSP issue. The organisation’s office in Bangalore 
city was closed and a court case filed.49   
In the course of the following years, the DSS suffered several additional splits 
and the growing number of different factions all continued to use the name DSS and 
speak in the name of the whole organisation.50  All the factions taken together, the DSS 
was still by far the largest and most ramified Dalit organisation in the state, but it was no 
longer able to set a unifying agenda for the Dalit movement.  
 
New political actors, agendas and identities 
While the now highly fragmented DSS had lost its former position as the principal 
political representative of the Scheduled Castes and the BSP struggled to form a broader 
constituency of Bahujans, a number of new often locally confined Dalit organisations, 
many of them professional NGOs, emerged in the late 1990s. Contrary to the DSS and 
the BSP, the new Dalit organisations were typically not based on any particular ideology 
or promoting a coherent vision for the Indian society, but gave priority to the 
development of local Dalit communities and issues of culture, identity and gender. In 
other words, the Dalit organisations emerging in the 1990s were generally far more 
inwardly oriented than the DSS and other Dalit organisations of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The identity of Dalit was now increasingly defined in positive terms as representing an 
independent cultural heritage and a morally superior way of life that deserved 
recognition and protection. Even the institution of caste that the Dalit movement for the 
past two decades had challenged and agitated against was now no longer condemned by 
all parts of the Dalit movement, but in fact declared as a natural component of Indian 
society and culture by an increasing number of activists and organisations.  
However, the overall development of the Dalit movement also meant that the 
identity of Dalit was losing its position as a central and uniting rallying point for the 
                                                 
49 The case was still pending during my fieldwork in 2002/3 and accordingly none of the DSS 
factions had a regular office or meeting place.  
50 The different DSS factions were invariably identified with their respective leaders and were 
thus known in the Dalit movement as the ‘D.G. Sagar faction’, ‘C.M. Muniappa faction’, 
‘Shivanna faction’ and ‘Mavalli Shankar faction’ to mention the largest DSS groups. The latter, 
however, styled itself as ‘DSS Ambedkar Wada’, alluding to being particularly faithful to the 
teachings of B.R. Ambedkar.  
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many disparate groupings within the movement. With the BSP propagating the much 
broader identity of Bahujan and groupings of Buddhist converts and Christians, on the 
other hand, propagating the much narrower identities of , respectively, Buddhist and 
Dalit Christian as part of their agitation it became increasingly clear that the identity of 
Dalit was just one among many possible, and partially overlapping,  political identities 
available to people from the Scheduled Castes in the struggle against caste-based 
discrimination and exploitation.  
 With the formation of the organisation ‘Madiga Reservation Horata Samiti’ 
(MRHS) around the turn of the century, the fragility of the political identity of Dalit was 
further accentuated, since the MRHS struggled to achieve separate quotas for the Madiga 
caste within the general reservation quotas for the Scheduled Castes in education and 
public employment.51 The MRHS claimed that the Madigas as a group received a 
disproportionately small share of the total reservation quota for the Scheduled Castes 
compared with the Holeyas and other Scheduled Castes. In organising members of the 
Madiga caste separately, however, the MRHS broke the principle of organising the 
Scheduled Castes collectively which had prevailed in the Dalit movement in Karnataka 
since its emergence in the mid-1970s. The agitation of the MRHS upset many old-time 
DSS activists who believed that the political unity of the Scheduled Castes was one of 
the most important achievements of the movement. Others – particularly Madigas  – 
however, claimed that there was no inherent conflict between the Madigas’ struggle for a 
fair share of the reservation quotas and the overall joined struggle of the Dalit movement 
against discrimination and exploitation.  
 The MRHS was probably the most talked about grassroots organisation 
internally in the Dalit movement during the eleven months of my fieldwork despite the 
fact that the MRHS held remarkably few public manifestations during this period 
compared to any of the other Dalit organisations that I knew of in the Bangalore area.52 It 
was thus not the actual political activities of the MRHS –or even the demand of a more 
equal division of reservation opportunities – that upset so many DSS activists. Rather it 
was the political implications of MRHS’s struggle, which pointed out that the Scheduled 
                                                 
51The MRHS was inspired by the struggle of the Madiga Reservation Porata Samiti (MRPS), 
which since the 1990s has fought for a separate reservation quota for the Madiga caste in the 
neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh.  
52 I actually never succeeded in meeting the leader of the MRHS, Keshav Murthy, despite phone 
contact, or any other leading figures of the organisation – and I missed the only large 
demonstration of the MRHS in 2003. However, I did speak to a number of different activists, 
from the DSS as well as other organisations who had been involved in the activities of the MRHS. 
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Castes did not always have coincident political interests that were thought to be 
disturbing.53   
Summary 
In recounting the history of the Dalit movement in Karnataka, I have shown how the 
movement has gradually changed from being a predominantly leftist outfit with a strong 
anti-caste agenda in the 1970s and early 1980s into a multifaceted, heterogeneous 
political field that in the early 2000s increasingly incorporated groups and organisations 
struggling primarily for cultural recognition and parliamentary power.  
The increased demands for cultural recognition and parliamentary 
representation in the 1990s and 2000s may, as Guru and Chakravarty (2005) and 
Rodrigues (2010) propose, be interpreted as a reaction to the unredeemed promises of 
widespread social welfare and economic development of the modern Indian democracy 
and as an adjustment to the new political situation in the state, in which issues of culture, 
religion and identity have gained centre stage. While the present study on the whole 
supports this analysis, it also shows that the dominant anti-caste agenda of the Dalit 
movement already in the 1970s and 1980s was continuously challenged by efforts to 
celebrate and revalue Dalit culture. 
 If we include the short-lived experience of Bhim Sena in the history of the 
Dalit movement, it moreover becomes clear that even the separatist stance that an 
increasing number of Dalit organisations and activists today advocate is far from a new 
tendency. It is therefore my argument that the dilemmas pertaining to contemporary Dalit 
politics – and the schisms they cause – have actually made themselves felt right since the 
emergence of the Dalit movement, albeit to a lesser extent than today. The politicisation 
of Dalit identity has thus always constituted a genuine dilemma to the Dalit movement 
that has balanced between representing Dalits as the downtrodden, stigmatised victims of 
caste oppression and as bearers of a rich and morally superior cultural tradition. 
                                                 
53 In addition to the MRHS a number of other smaller Madiga organisations like ‘Madiga 
Dandora’ had emerged in Karnataka in the early 2000s with the aim of celebrating Madiga 
identity and culture, which often took the form of  hour-long thamate drum sessions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 IMAGINING LIBERATION: PERSONAL EMANCIPATION OR 
CULTURAL RECOGNITION? 
 
‘Certainly, I am a Dalit. .....eh.., well.., I do not always feel that I am a Dalit. I am a 
human being, basically. I want to be a human being. I never wanted to be a Dalit. I 
was forced to be a Dalit. I never contested to become a Dalit, it is not an 
appointment, but society pointed out “you are a Dalit”. So now I am struggling to 
overcome, I am struggling to become a human being.’ 
Siddalingaiah, writer, poet, and folklorist, co-founder of the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti 
(DSS) 
 
‘The Aryan invaders created the first divide and rule system in the world. Those 
who escaped became tribals; those who protested became the so-called Dalits, the 
original inhabitants. Our people lost land and crown. They made us beggars – 
Untouchables. We lost our place. In our own land, we became landless. In our own 
kingdom, we became Untouchables.’ 
B. Gopal, president of the Karnataka unit of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
 
’Our people are thinkers and fighters, not ‘broken people’ that is a concept taken 
from Ambedkar. I am not ‘broken’, I am not poor. Economic difference is there, 
that is materially correct, but in this village, the poor are very rich. If you first 
accept that you are poor, it is very difficult to change your mind.’ 
Chenappa, activist in the Dalit mattu Mahila Chaluvali (DMC) 
 
 
In this chapter, I will examine how differently leaders and activists in the Dalit 
movement interpreted Dalit identity in order to understand the overall conceptions of 
oppression and liberation that characterised some of the different Dalit groups and 
organisations in Karnataka 2002/2003. For why is it that the identity of Dalit for some 
activists constituted a negative, stigmatised label that must be destroyed along with the 
entire institution of caste, while it for other activists constituted a wealth of cultural 
heritage and a step stone for social advancement and liberation?  
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Representing Dalit identity  
In the summer 2003, I often heard young activists from a number of different new Dalit 
organisations discuss the possibility of preparing and serving beef biryani – a rice 
speciality usually prepared with chicken or mutton for festive occasions – in the central 
public park of Bangalore. This proposed action would mimic one of the famous DSS 
actions from the mid-1980s when activists went to the streets carrying water pots to 
distribute drinking water to the passers-by (Yadav 1998).  
Both the action of water distribution and the proposed action of serving beef 
biryani implicitly referred to the stigmatisation of the ‘untouchable’ castes, but even 
though the two actions may appear to be rather similar, the messages conveyed by them 
would be entirely different. Water and beef are both ‘substances’ that are intimately 
connected to the symbolic representation of Dalit identity. Water, because it is 
considered highly susceptible for ritual pollution in the Hindu cosmology. On this 
pretext, people from ‘untouchable’ castes have been prevented from using the wells of 
the upper castes and drinking water from the common pot in the school class. Beef, 
because it is a commonly relished food among a number of ‘untouchable’ communities 
that contrary to the caste Hindus do not consider cows to be sacred. Moreover, eating 
beef is associated with extreme oppression since people from the ‘untouchable’ castes 
have often been forced to eat the carrions of the upper castes’ cattle out of sheer hunger.  
The water distribution by the DSS publicly tested people’s mindsets: whether 
they would take water from a Dalit or not, that is: whether they would treat him as a 
fellow human being or as a polluting ‘untouchable’. The action thus expressed a plea for 
inclusion into the mainstream society as individual human beings, and sharing water 
served as a symbol of equality and freedom from the oppressive caste barriers. The 
proposed action of serving beef biryani publicly, on the other hand, would convey a 
radically different message because of the politically sensitive issue of cow-slaughter, 
which the Hindu nationalist movement has fiercely propagated against for the past forty 
years.54 Therefore, an action of serving beef would be received as a downright 
provocation and as an insult to all caste Hindus and definitely not as an invitation to tear 
down caste barriers. Eating beef publicly would be a symbol of cultural pride and 
outright defiance towards the dominant norms and values of the caste Hindu majority 
                                                 
54 Like in most Indian states, cow slaugther is legally prohibited in Karnataka as per the 
Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaugther and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964. For a historical 
account of the Hindu nationalist propagation of ‘cow protection’, see o’Toole (2003). 
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and a harsh commentary to the Hindu religious forces perpetually trying to include Dalits 
in the ‘mainstream’ Hindu fold.55  
The proposal of serving beef biryani publicly was not carried out while I was in 
Karnataka. However, the different political messages of the two actions illustrate well 
the difference between what I in the previous chapter termed as a politics of personal 
emancipation and a politics of cultural recognition, respectively. While the action of 
distributing water focused on restoring the social status of the individual and erasing the 
stigma of Dalit identity, an action of serving beef would aim at articulating and 
celebrating the cultural identity of the ‘untouchable’ castes and expose the socio-cultural 
hegemony of upper caste Hindus. As a symbol of Dalit identity, eating beef thus relates 
social oppression to cultural tradition, implicating that freedom from oppression is 
dependent on recognition of cultural difference – and not denial of it. 
The radically different political goals of personal emancipation and cultural 
recognition, respectively, may be analysed as reflecting two different, coexisting ways of 
understanding the notions of identity and culture. As pointed out by the German 
anthropologist Martin Sökefeld (1999), the notion of identity may refer both to the self-
identity of the individual and to the cultural identity of the group. Used in the meaning of 
self-identity, identity refers to the self-contained subjectivity and integrity of the 
individual self; while identity used in the meaning of cultural identity refers to some kind 
of essential characteristics shared by a specific group. The concept of identity thus 
connotes significant mutual relations of similarity and difference among individuals and 
among groups, as it simultaneously refers to the specific intrinsic qualities, which 
distinguish one individual from the other, and to the shared characteristics, which unite 
one group of individuals while separating it from other groups.56 Here it is important to 
note that the notions of ‘self-identity’ and ‘cultural identity’ should not be conceived as 
independent or conflicting phenomena, but rather as continuous and mutually 
complementary aspects of personhood and collective being. In practice, however, the 
two aspects of identity are often experienced as conflicting by the individual, when his or 
                                                 
55 Beef is traditionally eaten by many Muslims, Christians and ‘untouchable’ castes, including 
Holeyas and Madigas who do not hold the cow sacred. Serving beef publicly would therefore 
furthermore draw attention to the convergence of political aims of Dalits and the Muslim and 
Christian religious minorities, who are all resisting the Hindu nationalist agenda, and point to a 
possible political alliance between these communities.  
56 The distinction between ‘self-identity’ and ‘social’, ‘cultural’ or ‘collective’ identity is 
common in psychology, sociology and anthropology. For instance the British sociologist Richard 
Jenkins (2000) makes a similar distinction between self identification and group identification and 
further adds the notion of social categorisation, with which he denotes the identity ascribed to a 
group or category of people by others.  
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her personal experience of self deviates considerably from the prevailing meanings 
ascribed to the cultural identity (s)he is supposed to share. 
  
Universalist visions of personal emancipation 
When I asked Dalit movement activists about the meaning of Dalit identity and its 
relation to the oppression and discrimination that the Scheduled Castes suffer, they 
generally tended to approach the issue of identity either from the perspective of the 
individual or from the perspective of the Scheduled Castes as a group. Those who greatly 
emphasised the individual’s loss of dignity and personal standing as a consequence of the 
humiliating practices of untouchability generally wished for a thorough abolition of caste 
to set the individual free from the stigmatising label of the ‘untouchable’ identity. 
Whereas those who emphasised the misrecognition and suppression of the Scheduled 
Castes’ culture and traditions thought that the Dalit movement should struggle for an 
overall social, cultural and political strengthening of the Scheduled Castes in relation to 
the upper castes. The Dalit movement was thus split between a universalist and a 
communitarian approach to the issue of Dalit liberation which significantly affected the 
political and strategic choices of the different groupings and organisations in the 
movement.  
Siddaraju, a bank officer in his 40s and a former leading DSS activist, who now 
characterised himself as a critical sympathiser of the Dalit movement, recollected an 
experience from his student days when I asked him about his personal experiences of 
oppression. One evening he and his friends were hanging out in front of the SC/ST hostel 
where they lived, when a traffic accident suddenly happened. A tempo rolled over on the 
road in front of them and people were screaming from fear and pain. Siddaraju and his 
friends rushed to the vehicle and he immediately stretched out his hand to help a woman 
free from the wreck. To his great astonishment, however, she did not take his hand but 
looked at him and asked ‘What is your caste?’ ‘I was stunned and I was hurt, totally 
disappointed,’ he remembered. ‘I started feeling that I was committing a mistake.’ 
Siddaraju stressed the psychological consequences of discrimination and 
marginalisation: always feeling out place and despised. ‘Dalits develop an inferiority 
complex because of the way we are looked down upon. It itself kills us – kills our self-
confidence.‘ Siddaraju did not want to identify himself as a Dalit: ‘If anybody asks about 
my caste, I will tell I have no caste and no religion.’ He explained that there had been 
attempts in the DSS to stress the proposition that ‘Dalit is dignified’, but he himself did 
not approve of that interpretation and could not think of anything positive about being a 
Dalit. Siddaraju did not like that anybody, high or low, took pride in his or her caste. 
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According to him, the Dalit struggle was not about the uplift of the Scheduled Castes, but 
about abolishing caste. He did not want a relatively higher degree of equality in the 
society; he wanted complete equality and a complete demolition of the caste system.  
Siddaraju did not deny the existence of cultural difference: ‘Every caste in 
India has its own culture or subculture. Dalits have their own cultural background, 
speak a rustic kind of language and are not as religious as others.’ However, he did not 
call for either preservation or recognition of this cultural difference. From his 
perspective, cultural difference was a historical fact, not a value in itself and therefore he 
did not regard the prospect of ‘losing’ Dalit culture in the case of a complete abolition of 
caste as a threat. Siddaraju’s political vision was one of a thoroughly secular and 
democratic society made up by free and equal individuals and he deeply lamented the 
communalist tendencies of present Indian politics. In his opinion, the traditional socio-
political power structures, based on caste and religious affiliation, were incompatible 
with the modern values of parliamentary democracy. Like many other former and present 
DSS activists, Siddaraju thus believed in a universalist and modernist vision of an Indian 
society of free and equal individuals, in which cultural and religious identities are 
irrelevant to social interaction and individual life chances.  
Siddaraju had been highly inspired by the writings of Ambedkar in his youth, 
but it was the meeting with the historical materialism of Marxist thinking which had 
profoundly shaped his way of thinking. ‘It has really enriched me and changed the way I 
look on society. After reading Marx, I started losing the inferiority complex and 
developing myself. Siddaraju thus put emphasis on the restoration of the individual’s 
sense of self and related this aim directly to the struggle for a thorough redistribution of 
economic resources. Siddaraju generally used the term Dalit in the very literary sense of 
the word as somebody who is downtrodden and broken because of the caste system and 
the implicated notion of untouchability. With his explicit focus on both personal 
emancipation and economic redistribution as the two main objectives of the Dalit 
movement, he thus stayed with the original ideology of the Dalit movement as it was 
formulated by the DSS more than thirty years ago. 
Another declared Marxist, the renowned writer, poet and folklorist Dr. 
Siddalingaiah was also committed to the idea of radically abolishing caste. Siddalingaiah 
had been one of the leading figures of the Dalit literary movement in the beginning of the 
1970s and was later one of the original founders of the DSS. He was then known for his 
militantly aggressive poems aimed against the upper caste oppressors. ‘Kick them, beat 
them, skin these bastards alive’ sounds a famous passage from one of his poems which 
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significantly shaped the consciousness of young Dalit activists in the 1970s.57 
Siddalingaiah grew up in the impoverished environment of a large, miserable Dalit slum 
in Bangalore and worked his way up to his present prestigious office as professor and 
dean at Bangalore University. During one of my interviews with Siddalingaiah, I asked 
him, if he still considered himself a Dalit in spite of his present social and economic 
status. “Certainly I am a Dalit,’ he immediately answered, but then elaborated: ‘Eh.., 
well.., I do not always feel that I am a Dalit. I am a human being, basically. [...] but 
society pointed out “you are a Dalit”.58  
Like Siddaraju, Siddalingaiah emphasised the imposed character of Dalit 
identity and the sufferings of the individual because of the ‘Dalit label’. Siddalingaiah 
thus suggested that the Scheduled Castes’ cultural identity prevented them from being 
recognised as individuals and was even used to negate their very humanity. Personally, 
he felt hurt when he was always pointed out as the ‘famous Dalit poet’ in conferences 
and seminars when other poets and writers were addressed without any reference to their 
caste. In the experience of Siddalingaiah, the Dalit label and its degrading connotations 
therefore always adhered to the person regardless of his or her merits and economic 
status. 
Contrary to Siddaraju, however, Siddalingaiah as a folklorist took much 
interest in the distinctive cultural traditions of the Scheduled Castes, on which he had 
published several studies. Therefore, Siddalingaiah fully realised that the abolition of 
caste and consequential abandonment of a separate caste identities might give rise to 
feelings of alienation and rootlessness, even for people from the Scheduled Castes who 
suffered stigmatisation and discrimination because of their identities. In fact, one of his 
own earliest poems ‘They are still sitting there’ related to the sense of loss and alienation 
that the Dalit protagonist – allegorically described as a sacrificial ram – experiences, 
when he is violently forced to renounce his own cultural background and comply with 
the upper caste norms in order to be recognised as a human being (Siddalingaiah 2002).59 
To Siddalingaiah, the issue of Dalit identity thus posed a real political dilemma, since he 
on the one hand appreciated the uniqueness and cultural worth of the Scheduled Castes’ 
customs and traditions and, on the other hand, maintained that the very existence of caste 
was the root cause of the Scheduled Castes’ present misery.  However, Siddalingaiah 
believed that caste had to be abolished to set the individual free and was deeply 
concerned about the new tendencies in the Dalit movement to glorify Dalit identity and 
demand recognition of the Dalits’ cultural values and traditions while accepting the caste 
                                                 
57 The poem ‘A Song’ is from Siddalingaiah’s début collection of poems ‘Hole Madigara Hadu’, 
which was published in 1976. See Nagaraj (1994: 19) for a larger extract of this poem.  
58 See the quotation in its full length in the beginning of this chapter. 
59 See Nagaraj (1994: 22) for further interpretation of the poem ‘They are still sitting there’. 
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structures as ‘natural’ to the Indian society. As a Marxist, he moreover found that the 
economic deprivation of the Scheduled Castes was simply not taken seriously enough by 
those who took this stand. ‘After all you cannot eat culture,’ he explained. 
For both Siddaraju and Siddalingaiah, it was the self-identity of the individual 
that was focus for their interpretation of Dalit identity, rather than the cultural identity of 
the Scheduled Castes – or of the Holeya Caste, to which they both belonged.  Focusing 
on the psychological pain of the individual, they both regarded the institution of caste as 
the root cause of the Dalits’ depression and despair. Putting emphasis on the universal, 
autonomous individual rather than the community of caste(s), they therefore accepted the 
idea that the institution of caste and with that the cultural identity of the Scheduled 
Castes had to be opposed in order to secure the freedom of the individual. 
At the time of my fieldwork, neither Siddaraju nor Siddalingaiah were actively 
involved in the activities of the DSS anymore. Siddaraju was more or less equally 
disillusioned with all parts of the DSS, while Siddalingaiah continued to support the 
factions of the DSS that maintained the original ideology of the Dalit movement. 
However, the approach of the two old-time Dalit activists was by and large shared by all 
the DSS leaders and activists that I interviewed and talked to. All insisted that the 
ultimate aim of Dalit struggle was to abolish caste. On the short term, however, they 
continued to fight for the rights of the Scheduled Castes in the name of Dalits and thus 
promoted the identity they wished to dismantle.  
  
Liberation through caste-based parliamentary power 
In spite of the fact that most of the leading BSP members in Karnataka had a past with 
the DSS, they now generally had a completely different approach to the issues of caste 
and identity than most DSS leaders. They firmly believed that parliamentary power was 
the key to stop the discrimination and exploitation of the Scheduled Castes and usually 
described the BSP as the direct heir to Ambedkar’s unfinished struggle to unite the 
Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes into a single voting bloc. Whereas DSS 
leaders tended to emphasise the suffering and psychological pain of the individual when 
they argued for the need of thoroughly abolishing caste, BSP leaders often emphasised 
how the Scheduled Castes as a community was misrecognised, betrayed and exploited, 
when they argued for the need of capturing parliamentary power.   
N. Mahesh was one of the prominent leaders of the BSP in Karnataka. In the 
late 1980s, he was part of one of the first splinter groups to break away from the DSS 
because of a general discontent with the political strategies of the movement. He 
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explained that the BSP was not against the institution of caste as such, but specifically 
against what he termed as ‘casteism’.’If a Gowda does not want to give his daughter to 
my son [in marriage], I don’t mind. Let them keep their identity, but exploitation in the 
name of caste should go.’ 60 N. Mahesh believed that the caste structures originated in 
ancient India where they ‘all were tribal groups’ and he did therefore see no harm in the 
system itself. ’Once casteism disappears, caste is not at all a problem,’ he explained. In 
his view, the practice of caste-based discrimination was largely the result of complex 
psychological mechanisms which should be countered mainly with educational and 
economic empowerment of the oppressed. If that was accomplished, N. Mahesh believed 
that discrimination would disappear by itself.  
To emphasise his point, N. Mahesh explained how he had personally faced 
discrimination until he became educated, obtained a government job and got money to 
spend. Then his status completely changed and he could suddenly move freely, drink 
water wherever he wanted and visit hotels and temples as he liked – while his father, 
who had worked as a bonded labourer, was still discriminated against. According to N. 
Mahesh, Scheduled Caste identity was not the root cause for discrimination and 
exploitation, and neither was caste. Therefore, he did not call for a radical change of the 
society’s underlying social and economic structures as did the DSS, but suggested that 
the Scheduled Castes should educate themselves and utilise the democratic structures to 
gain political power collectively. The responsibility for the continued oppression of the 
Scheduled Castes was thus as much on themselves as on the upper castes, given the fact 
that the Indian Constitution granted all citizens the freedom of vote.61 For N. Mahesh, the 
social institution of caste was thus not a problem in itself. Quite the contrary, he regarded 
caste identity as a valuable social resource which the Scheduled Castes had still not 
learnt to utilise politically to their own advantage. Instead of struggling against caste and 
thereby undermining their own cultural identity, the real challenge for the Scheduled 
Castes was to build a broad political alliance uniting all subordinate castes in order to 
grab political power collectively. 
  Contrary to Siddaraju, Siddalingaiah and many other old-time Dalit movement 
activists, N. Mahesh did not regard caste identity as a social and psychological 
                                                 
60 Gowda is another word for the Vokkaliga caste. The Vokkaligas/Gowdas are classified as 
OBCs in rural Karnataka and form part of the ‘Bahujan Samaj’ or great majority that the BSP 
struggles to create and mobilise politically. As a ‘dominant’ caste of landowning cultivators that 
typically employ people from the Scheduled Castes and play a powerful role in village politics, 
the Gowdas are often experienced as the immediate social and economic oppressors by the 
Scheduled Castes.  
61 The fact that B.R. Ambedkar was the chairman of the committee that drafted the Indian 
constitution was by many BSP activists interpreted as a proof of the fundamental justice and 
infallibility of India’s parliamentary democracy.  
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straightjacket for the individual, but as an inherent aspect of personhood in Indian 
society. In his opinion, the aim of Dalit liberation was not a society without castes, but a 
society of equal and autonomous castes. N. Mahesh thus regarded the Scheduled Castes’ 
deep depression as a reflection of the existing power relations between the different caste 
communities in Indian and not as an essential implication of caste. In his opinion it was 
therefore the present power relations that had to be changed, not the institution of caste 
itself.  
 N. Mahesh’s approach to caste and to the aim of Dalit struggle was shared by 
many leading BSP members in Karnataka. Some BSP members, however, explained that 
it was still the ultimate goal of the BSP to abolish caste. 62 ‘If we get power, we can 
remove caste,’ the treasurer of BSP in Karnataka, O. Rajanna, assured me, although he 
later added that ’because we were suppressed for two thousand years, now at least for 
hundred or two hundred years we should rule’. Like many other Dalit activists, O. 
Rajanna was thus split between the wish to completely abolish caste and the wish to 
strengthen the power and social standing of the Scheduled Castes in order to redress their 
collective humiliation and subjugation. Nonetheless, he believed that the grab of political 
power through broad caste-based alliances was the only way to create real change for the 
Scheduled Castes.  
By the adversaries of the BSP, the party’s attempt to build a political 
constituency of Bahujan Samaj was usually dismissed as opportunist ‘number politics’ 
that reduced Dalit struggle and democratic politics to a question of demography and 
diluted the ideological foundation of the Dalit movement. Particularly, the coalition 
government between the BSP and its sworn enemies in the Hindu nationalist party BJP 
in Uttar Pradesh was the object of heavy criticism. For the BSP leaders, however, the 
Dalit struggle was a struggle for power with all means, even if it meant collaborating 
with the perceived oppressors of the Dalits and accepting caste as the basis of society and 
of political power. According to the state president of the BSP in Karnataka, B. Gopal, 
the party’s alliance with the BJP in the state of Uttar Pradesh was thus not in any way 
betraying the principles of the party’s anti-Brahminical ideology.63 Quite the contrary he 
explained, since the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh’s coalition government, Mayawathi, 
                                                 
62 In her study of the history of the BSP, the political scientist Suddha Pai describes BSP’s 
ideology as ‘uncompromising in its attitude towards the caste system, which they refuse to accept 
and hope to change on capturing power’ (Pai 2001: 270). As I have described here, however, 
many – if not even the majority – of the BSP leaders and activists that I interacted with during my 
study, now regarded the struggle against caste as futile.  
63 At the time of the fieldwork, the BSP had formed a coalition government together with the BJP 
since 1997. This coalition was a highly controversial in the Dalit movement, since the BJP as a 
Hindu nationalist party was identified as the ideological enemy of Dalits and as a representative 
of the Brahmin castes and their political interests.  
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was from the BSP. ’We have not joined the BJP’, he explained, ’we have made them to 
support us’.  
Like N. Mahesh and most other BSP leaders and activists, B. Gopal explained 
the present status of the Scheduled Castes as a result of the Aryan invasion more than 
three thousand years ago and the historic clashes between Hindus (Brahmins) and 
Buddhists that B.R. Ambedkar had described. Thus, the history of the Scheduled Castes 
was a history of loss and enslavement that had bereaved the communities of their 
original cultural identities and left them without land, dignity and power – making Dalit 
a non-identity solely characterised in the negative as a state of deprivation, humiliation 
and oppression. While, B. Gopal and other BSP leaders and activist accepted caste as 
part of Indian society, they did not want to rehabilitate or glorify the existing cultural 
traditions of the Scheduled Castes. Quite the contrary, they wanted the Scheduled Castes 
to come to the middleclass mainstream, but without accepting Hinduism as a common 
cultural denominator.  
Following the example of Ambedkar, many BSP leaders and activists favoured 
the identity of Buddhist, which they found represented the true, dignified identity of the 
Scheduled Castes and quite a number of BSP leaders and supporters of the party had 
even started practising Buddhism by changing  to a vegetarian diet and going to the 
Buddhist temple regularly. Even though the BSP leaders in Karnataka firmly believed in 
the political necessity of uniting the Bahujan Samaj of SCs, OBCs and religious 
minorities politically, I never heard any of them identifying themselves with this 
umbrella identity. The identity of Bahujan Samaj was thus a purely strategic invention 
that should help the Scheduled Castes to seize power and change the existing power 
relations in the country.  
 
Communitarian visions of cultural recognition 
While the BSP leaders usually had a profoundly different perception of caste and 
discrimination than the former and present DSS leaders, they did all agree that the Dalit 
struggle should aim at bringing the Scheduled Castes on par with the general population 
socially and economically and bring them to ‘the mainstream’ as it was often formulated. 
However, some of the new Dalit organisations that had emerged in the 1990s challenged 
that idea and claimed that the aim of Dalit struggle was to protect the unique culture and 
lifestyle of the Dalits from the imposition of the values and lifestyles of the Hindu 
mainstream which was successfully propagated by the Hindu nationalist movement.  
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One of the Dalit organisations in Karnataka that explicitly struggled for the 
recognition of Dalit culture was the small, but very active ‘Dalit mattu Mahila Chaluvali’ 
(Dalit and Women’s Movement) (DMC). In this organisation, located on the southern 
outskirts of Bangalore, where new high-rise luxury apartments were now mushrooming 
in glaring contrast to the neighbouring poor villages, questions of culture, identity and 
history were the pivotal points of agitation. The DMC mainly worked with 
consciousness-raising of local Scheduled Caste youth through meetings, workshops and 
seminars on issues of e.g., democracy, women’s rights and globalisation. On all such 
occasions, community singing and drum and dance performances were important parts of 
the program, underscoring the importance that the organisation put on culture and 
identity.  
The DMC was a grassroots organisation of mainly young people from the 
Holeya and the Bhovi caste, the latter being one of the few Scheduled Castes that is not 
affected by the stigma of untouchability. Contrary to probably all other Dalit 
organisations in Karnataka, the DMC had a flat, democratic structure, no formal 
leadership and an almost equal representation of men and women among its core 
members. The organisation had started out in the early 1990s as a small educational and 
income-generating project for Scheduled Caste women lead by nuns from a local 
convent, but had over the years developed into a political Dalit organisation that was 
highly critical of the established Dalit movement and its visions of liberation.  
For the DMC activists the aim of Dalit struggle was not to become part of the 
mainstream culture and work for the eradication of separate caste identities, but quite the 
contrary to rediscover, strengthen and revaluate the cultural identities of the Scheduled 
Castes in order not to become swallowed up by the Hindu mainstream. While DSS and 
BSP activists typically made great efforts to point out that people from the Scheduled 
Castes were honest and respectable people, who were just as moral and civilized as 
everybody else in the Indian society, the activists of the DMC presented themselves as 
‘uncivilized people’ who were drinking, smoking, fighting and quarrelling. According to 
the DMC activists, Dalit culture was rough and simple, characterised by tough living 
conditions and tough manners and by considerable consumption of alcohol by both men 
and women. Most importantly, Dalit culture was characterised as a culture of fairness, 
integrity and equality as opposed to the oppressive, hierarchical culture of caste Hindus. 
‘If a husband beats his wife, she hits him back,’ the activists used to tell me as an 
example of the rough type of gender equality allegedly typical of Dalit culture.   
The DMC activists thus described Dalit identity much in the same way as it 
was generally perceived and imagined by the upper castes, but in their opinion this 
characteristic was nothing to be ashamed of, quite the contrary. According to the DMC 
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activists, it was thus not the psychological onslaught on the feelings of the individual, 
which was the main problem of the Scheduled Castes, but the systematic devaluation, 
stigmatisation and discrimination of the community.   
When the Jesuit run ‘Indian Social Institute’ (ISI) in Bangalore in 2003 offered 
to host a DMC youth seminar on democracy for free, the DMC first accepted the 
generous offer, but later decided to move the event to their own humble premises. The 
ISI was too disciplined for their people, the DMC activists explained, when I asked why 
they had called the arrangement off. In the premises of ISI smoking and drinking was 
prohibited and they were not allowed to sing and play late in the evening either. 
Moreover, the whole place was not compatible with the lifestyle of ‘their people’ I was 
explained: the beds were too soft and the food was a middleclass type of food with rice 
and too many dishes. As one activist explained, they were used to eating ragi mudde64 
and sleep on a mat on the floor; that was their culture and they did not want to change it 
for a more comfortable life. While the Dalit movement in Karnataka for decades had 
struggled to bring the Scheduled Castes on par with the general population  and secure 
them a comfortable life with soft beds and ample good food, the DMC instead attempted 
to preserve and revalue the culture and lifestyle of Scheduled Castes. The DMC thus 
wished to profoundly change the way that Dalit culture and identity was conceived and 
with that the very meaning of poverty and oppression.  
Despite of the name of their organisation, the DMC activists had almost 
stopped using the term Dalit in their agitation, realising that each of the Scheduled Caste 
communities had their own historic identity and culture. The DMC activists were not 
against the term Dalit as a general designation, but took pride in their individual caste 
identities of Holeyas and Bhovis. The fact that each caste constituted an individual 
community with its own unique history and traditions was in their opinion a cultural 
value that had to be recognised and appreciated by the Dalit movement – and not hushed 
up, which for many years had been the case in Karnataka. The DMC activists thus 
clearly repudiated the idea that Dalit identity should be defined in the negative as a state 
of loss and deprivation, the way many old-time DSS activists tended to define it. Quite 
the contrary, they thought that the identity of Dalit – and of the individual communities 
denoted by the term – should be defined in the positive as a wealth of culture and 
tradition. It was thus not the poverty or personal pain and agony caused by caste-based 
discrimination that was the focus of DMC, but the systematic devaluation of the 
Scheduled Castes as culture-bearing communities.  
                                                 
64 Ragi mudde (ragi balls) are chewy, brown, dough-like balls made of finger millet flour and 
water, typical of rural Karnataka where they are usually eaten with a sauce of vegetables, lentils 
or meat.  
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 Focusing on the cultural identity of the Scheduled Caste communities, rather 
than on the self-identity of the individual, the Dalit struggle of the DMC was first and 
foremost a struggle for cultural recognition and self-respect, while issues of poverty, 
untouchability and political power were generally not given much attention by the 
organisation.  When I once directly addressed the question of untouchability, the 
informal leader of the DMC, Chenappa, stated that these traditional forms of insult and 
disrespect should generally be ignored and not made the pivotal of political agitation 
since that would simply underscore the general victimisation of the Scheduled Castes 
and contribute to a negative self-image65. Chenappa was thus a sharp critic of the 
traditional Dalit movement, particularly the DSS, and of the way the Scheduled Castes in 
his opinion had been represented solely as ‘broken’ or downtrodden victims of 
oppression. ‘I am not “broken”,’ he insisted and also denied to be poor, even though he 
and his family like the other DMC activists lived on a very small budget, not a bit higher 
than the other Scheduled Caste families in his village. In his opinion, the portrayal of the 
Scheduled Castes as poor contributed to the state of victimisation and self-pity that had 
characterised the Dalit movement for decades. ‘If you first accept that you are poor, it is 
very difficult to change your mind,’ he explained and suggested that the Scheduled 
Castes should in fact be regarded as very rich because of their great physical and 
intellectual strength and endurance.  
 The DMC thus propagated a radically different identity for the Scheduled Caste 
than that of the traditional Dalit movement and consistently refused to accept the 
portrayal of the Scheduled Caste communities as broken and humiliated victims of upper 
caste domination. Struggling for cultural recognition of, the DMC activists dreamt of a 
society where the Scheduled Castes were thoroughly autonomous, independent and self-
contained and had stopped measuring themselves against the values and lifestyles of the 
Hindu middleclass. While the DSS originally wanted to undermine and transgress caste 
boundaries and create an Indian society based on universal values of individual freedom 
and integrity, the DMC on the contrary envisaged an Indian society that fully 
acknowledged the value of cultural difference and made room for a new decidedly non-
hierarchical form of social coexistence between different communities.  
One of the great inspirations for the DMC was the Kannada writer and 
intellectual Mogalli Ganesh’s vision of bringing the Scheduled Castes back to their 
traditional artisan economies and lifestyles as a guard against the impact of economic 
                                                 
65 This view may be explained by the fact that Chenappa belonged to the ‘non-untouchable’ Bhovi 
caste and had never himself been exposed to practices of untouchability. However, the view was 
also expressed by DMC activists belonging to the ‘untouchable’ Holeya caste. Living on the 
outskirts of Bangalore City, however, the activists had never experienced untouchability the way 
it was practised in the remote villages of north and central Karnataka.  
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globalisation and liberalisation and as a source of social strength (Ganesh 2003).66 The 
DMC thus regarded the unique cultural characteristics of the Scheduled Castes as a 
social resource that still waited to be acknowledged and accepted by the people 
themselves. At the time of my fieldwork, Chenappa tried to raise money for a study of 
the cultural practices of the Bhovi caste in different parts of Karnataka as he found that 
the Bhovis – or Vaddas67 as he preferred to call his community – like most other 
Scheduled Caste communities were largely ignorant about their own history and cultural 
heritage and had uncritically accepted the depressed identity ascribed to them by others.  
Approaching the issue of identity from the perspective of the community, 
Chenappa did not perceive the continued existence of caste as an obstacle to Dalit 
liberation, but quite the contrary as the main prerequisite of freedom for the Scheduled 
Caste masses. Even Chenappa did, however, particularly during one of our many 
conversations question the meaning and significance of caste identity when he asked 
what did actually make him a Vadda as he was sitting there talking with me, one person 
to the other. Why did it make sense to characterise him as a Vadda and not just as 
Chenappa in conversation with Caroline, two different individuals with each their 
distinctive personal history?  ‘Basically, caste is ideology,’ he explained and thus 
accepted not only the significance of the individual, but also the constructedness of caste 
and community.68 The realisation that caste was essentially a social construct did not 
make Chenappa and the DMC demand the abolition of caste like the DSS and other old-
time Dalit organisations, quite the contrary they accepted caste as a lived reality and as 
an important part of history which could and should not be erased in the name of 
equality. Instead of demanding the abolition of caste as a solution to end discrimination 
and exploitation, the DMC therefore suggested a positive reinterpretation of caste as a 
source of community and solidarity that could serve as a protection against the 
dominance of the powerful upper castes. Contrary to the modernist visions of an Indian 
society of free and equal individuals, the DMC gave priority to the rehabilitation of 
                                                 
66 Mogalli Ganesh is a scholar of folklore and Kannada literature from the Kannada University in 
Hampi and a writer of fiction writing in Kannada. As one of the leading intellectuals of the 
contemporary Dalit movement in Karnataka, Mogalli Ganesh represents a communitarian 
approach to Dalit politics, much in contrast to the universalist approaches of intellectuals and 
founding fathers of the Dalit movement in the state like Siddalingaiah and Devanoor Mahadev.   
67 The Bhovi caste is also known as Vadda (also transcribed as Wadda, Odda, and Vaddera) in 
Karnataka. According to the DMC activists, ‘Bhovi’ was considered more respectable than 
Vadda, though Vadda was the original name of the caste.  
68 Chenappa had studied philosophy for a couple of semesters in a university correspondence 
course and was accordingly well versed in contemporary philosophical thinking and often referred 
to the thinking of Michel Foucault. The idea that caste was basically a social construction was 
therefore not at all unfamiliar to Chenappa, though he did never use exactly the English word 
’construction’ in any of our discussions.  
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caste-based community and thus prioritised cultural recognition over personal 
emancipation. 
  
Questioning universalism 
The increasing scepticism in the Dalit movement towards the universalist, anti-caste 
agenda, propagated by the DSS since the 1970s, has, as I described in the previous 
chapter, been interpreted as a reaction to the unredeemed promises of economic 
development and social welfare by the Congress party and as an adaptation to the 
growing communalisation of Indian politics. While my study on the whole supports that 
analysis, it also shows that the primary schism of the Dalit movement is not between a 
politics focused on economic redistribution and poverty alleviation, on the one hand, and 
a politics of identity formation, on the other, but between different ways of politicising 
Dalit identity. The Dalit movement is thus split between representing the identity of Dalit 
as an imposed ‘non-identity’ bereft of economic livelihood, social status and human 
dignity and as a culturally rich and vibrant collective tradition – or indeed many 
different, unique traditions.  
D.R. Nagaraj (1993), a Kannada literary critic and avowed sympathiser of the 
Dalit movement, finds that the political schism within the Dalit movement reflects the 
vastly different outlooks and experiences of the small educated, urban Scheduled Caste 
middleclass and the impoverished, uneducated rural masses. In his analysis of Dalit 
identity politics, Nagaraj describes the universalist approach to Dalit liberation as a mode 
of ‘alternative memory’ typical of the SC middleclass that does not accept the existence 
of any liberative elements in the living experience and cultural memories of the 
Scheduled Castes. In accepting that Dalit culture is basically worthless, however, this 
mode of representing Dalit identity does not provide a genuine alternative to the 
dominant representation of the ascribed ‘untouchable’ identity, Nagaraj argues, but 
basically reproduces the ruling ‘upper caste’ norms of society, while exposing the shame 
and self-hatred of the Scheduled Caste middleclass. The universalist approach to Dalit 
liberation, privileging self-identity over cultural identity and personal emancipation over 
cultural recognition does therefore not have a real subversive potential since the 
emancipation of the individual does not radically challenge the cultural hegemony of the 
‘upper caste’ Hindu mainstream.  
In contrast, Nagaraj characterises the communitarian approach to Dalit 
liberation as a mode of ‘radical revivalism’ that takes the actual practices and 
experiences of the Scheduled Caste majority as a starting point for political action and 
aims at transforming the symbolic values of Dalit culture and identity rather than 
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creating a new mainstream identity for the Scheduled Castes. When a growing number of 
Dalit organisations and activists in the early 2000s accepted caste as an inherent part of 
Indian society and embraced the struggle for cultural recognition, it may thus be 
interpreted as a far more radical protest than the anti-caste struggle for mainstreaming 
and personal emancipation. In insisting on the cultural worth and uniqueness of even the 
most stigmatised traditions and practises of the Scheduled Castes, the call for cultural 
recognition challenged the long-established universalist definition of social equality as 
absence of difference, insisting that the solution to stigmatisation and discrimination is 
not a political strategy of cultural dissolution and self-destruction.  
As we have seen, Nagaraj’s analysis may immediately be applied to the case of 
the DMC, whose activists did not only demand respect of their equal worth as individual 
human beings, but insisted on being respected collectively because of, not despite, their 
cultural identity and refused to conform to any of the established cultural norms of the 
‘upper castes’. When a growing number of Dalit activists and organisations in the early 
2000s had abandoned the struggle against caste and untouchability in favour of a politics 
of cultural recognition it may thus be interpreted as a protest against the tacit dominance 
of ‘upper caste’ cultural values, even within the Dalit movement. To some extent, 
Nagaraj’s analysis may also be applicable to the BSP whose leaders in many cases 
embraced and propagated their supposedly original Buddhist identity in contrast to the 
increasingly politicised identity of Hindu as a means of distancing themselves to the 
Hindu nationalist movement and its attempts to include the Scheduled Castes in the 
mainstream Hindu ‘we’. 
However, the present study does not quite support Nagaraj’s proposition that 
the strategic schism between personal emancipation and cultural recognition reflects the 
social schism between the small urban, educated Scheduled Caste middleclass that has 
‘come up in life’, as it is often expressed, and the large impoverished masses of mainly 
rural Scheduled Caste workers.69 Though many of the experienced DSS leaders had 
indeed advanced socially and economically, the individual factions of the DSS, taken 
together, still organised by far the largest number of villagers and urban poor in the state.  
Alternatively, the study suggests that the increased strategic schism between 
politics of personal emancipation and cultural recognition in part reflects the diminishing 
                                                 
69 It is important to note that Nagaraj’s book on the Dalit movement in Karnataka ‘The Flaming 
Feet’ was published in 1993, before the emergence of organisations like REDS, DMC and 
MRHS. Nararaj’s discussion of the politicisation of Dalit identity related specifically to the 
emerging contradictions between orthodox Ambedkarites, supporting the BSP, who refused to 
identify with any traditional elements of their identities and activists like Siddalingaiah, Nagaraj’s 
close friend, who took an interest in and openly appreciated the cultural and spiritual world of the 
Scheduled Castes with its many unique traditions, myths and legends. Still, I find that Nagaraj’s 
analysis is relevant to the present study and contributes to the argument.  
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influence and popularity of modernist, universalist ideologies in the Indian academia. In 
the early 2000s, it was no longer the ideas of Marx, Lohia or Ambedkar that were 
discussed by ‘progressive’ students, activists and NGO workers in meetings and 
seminars, but the ideas of post-structuralist and post-colonialist writers like Michel 
Foucault, Franz Fanon and the Kannada scholar Mogalli Ganesh. The last mentioned 
writers inspired a shift of focus from the modernist ‘sovereign’ subject to socially 
constructed differences and identities and a critique of the vision of a society ‘with only 
two castes: men and women’70 that characterised the universalist vision of liberty and 
equality. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have shown how the political visions of Dalit liberation expressed by 
Dalit leaders and activists in Karnataka were closely related to the way they perceived of 
Dalit identity and Dalit culture. Activists, who described Dalit identity in the negative as 
a ‘non-identity’ characterised primarily by the absence of human dignity generally 
perceived the stigmatisation of the Scheduled Castes as the worst aspects of oppression 
and shared a vision of a society of free and equal individuals completely free from caste 
divisions. Activists, who described Dalit identity as the collective expression of a rich 
and vibrant cultural tradition, on the other hand, emphasised the misrecognition and 
disrespect of the Scheduled Castes as a people or their lack of political power and 
generally shared a vision of a society of equal and autonomous communities, where no 
single caste or cluster of castes were dominating the others.       
Overall, the leaders and activists were divided between an agenda of personal 
emancipation and an agenda of cultural recognition; the former stressing the need to set 
the individual free from the oppressive stigma of untouchability and the latter stressing 
the need to strengthen the Scheduled Castes politically and culturally in order to be able 
to resist oppression and discrimination. The Dalit movement in Karnataka was thus torn 
between a universalist vision of a world free of social boundaries and divides and a 
communitarian vision of a world made up of individual communities with each their 
unique history and distinctive cultural traits and traditions.  
 
                                                 
70 The idea of a society with ‘only two castes: men and women’ was often presented as the natural 
ideal by particularly male DSS leaders and activists. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DALIT DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY, SOLIDARITY AND 
BELONGING 
 
‘The caste system is nothing but institutionalised oppression and egoism, built on the 
ideology of naanu, nandu, nanage [me, mine, for me only]’ 
Fr. S.D. Joseph, member of the Karnataka Dalit Christian Federation (KDCF) 
 
‘The caste system is an obstacle to human instincts, an obstacle for human beings to 
behave like human beings. One has to be against it and go against it.’ 
Devanoor Mahadev, renowned writer and intellectual, co-founder of the DSS  
 
‘India is a country of castes. Castes have been in existence here from time 
immemorial. If castes had been a problem and unwanted, the people themselves 
would have destroyed it long ago. The very fact that caste continues to exist is proof 
that it is not only harmless, but also useful to the people.’ 
V.T. Rajshekar, journalist and editor of the fortnightly magazine ‘Dalit Voice’ 
(Rajshekar 2002:2) 
 
 
In this last chapter, I will turn the perspective from the issue of Dalit identity and the 
strategic dilemmas of politicising caste to the personal and emotional choices and 
dilemmas accompanying many Dalit activists’ political views on the issue of identity. As 
the previous chapters have suggested the Dalit movement in Karnataka is not only split 
between universalist and communitarian ideals of liberation and equality, but also 
between two coexistent, yet irreconcilable interpretations of caste as respectively an 
oppressive hierarchical institution and as the ‘natural’ manifestation of cultural 
difference. As I shall argue, the political schism of the Dalit movement does therefore 
not only reflect a strategic dilemma, but also a much deeper personal and emotional 
dilemma, relating to the innate dichotomy between the individual and the community and 
to the ambiguous reality of caste.   
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Institutionalised oppression or social resource? 
When asked about the meaning of caste, Dalit leaders and activists in Karnataka 
expressed two different views. On the one hand, caste was described as an inhuman and 
‘unnatural’ form of institutionalised oppression, based on the ritual distinction between 
purity and pollution of Hindu religion that defined the majority of the Scheduled Castes 
as so inherently low and polluted that they were untouchable to people from all other 
castes. On the other hand, caste was described as a social structure of competing ethno-
cultural communities, which was often explained with reference to the Aryan invasion of 
the Indian subcontinent several thousand years ago. The Dalit leaders and activists thus 
described caste in close accordance with the two general models of caste as, respectively, 
a static hierarchy and a dynamic structure of individual ethno-cultural communities as 
described by e.g., Gupta (2000, 2004) and Jayaram (1996).   
The catholic priest Fr. S.D. Joseph from the Karnataka Dalit Christian Federation 
(KDCF) expressed the first mentioned view on caste, when he during one of our 
conversations stated that caste was built on the ideology of ‘naanu, nandu, nanage’ (me, 
mine, for me only)  as a religiously legitimated hierarchy designed to keep others down. 
Though originating in the religious dichotomy between ritual purity and pollution of 
Hindu cosmology, the selfishness and nepotism associated with caste was found in all 
parts of Indian society, he claimed, and upper caste Hindus and upper caste Christians 
were all the same when it came to oppressive and discriminatory practices. To be a Dalit 
basically meant to be ‘suffering, suffocating and scared’ Fr. S.D. Joseph stated and thus 
thought of caste purely as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the Brahmins and 
upper castes.    
The opposite view was, as I have already described, maintained by a 
growing number of Dalit leaders and activists in the early 2000s. The controversial71 
journalist and editor of the fortnightly magazine ‘Dalit Voice’, V.T. Rajshekar, was 
one of the most ardent proponents of the view that caste was a natural component of 
Indian society. According to V.T. Rajshekar individual castes were comparable to 
separate nations72 or tribes that each shared a distinct history and cultural identity and 
whose members internally shared a high degree of solidarity. In his view caste was 
neither harmful nor the reason for the Scheduled Castes’ present misery and therefore 
                                                 
71 The former journalist on the national newspaper Indian Express, V.T. Rajshekar (Shetty), was a 
highly controversial figure in the Dalit movement in Karnataka, who used expressions as ‘Hindu 
Nazis’ and often sketched a world conspiracy between Brahmins and Jews and agitated for the 
usefulness of Mao’s doctrine that your enemy’s enemy is your friend. V.T. Rajshekar had many 
years ago discarded his last name Shetty, which was also the name of his caste, not to be 
associated with a particular caste membership.  
72 Cf. Rajshekar (2002). 
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he found it downright stupid to fight for the abolition of caste. ‘I have not found any 
Brahmins wanting to destroy caste,’ he claimed and explained the social, economic 
and cultural dominance of the Brahmins as a result of the strong bonds of intimacy 
and solidarity prevailing among the Brahminical castes.  I his view caste was a source 
of strength waiting to be exhausted by the individual Scheduled Castes, who 
unfortunately had been struggling for the abolition of caste in the name of equality. 
The religious interpretation of caste as a hierarchy based on the notions of ritual 
purity and pollution, did V.T. Rajshekar completely reject: ‘In India religion is a 
dress, what is important is blood,’ he explained and thus denied that caste was 
anything but another word for ethno-cultural difference.73  
When it comes to the characterisation of caste as a social institution, the 
lines are thus sharply drawn between those who demand the abolition of caste and 
those who struggle for the relative strengthening of the Scheduled Caste as a group. 
Nevertheless, it was my impression that many, if not the majority, of the Dalit 
activists actually had great difficulties imagining an Indian society without 
distinctions of caste in one or the other form.  
 
A difference that makes a difference 
One day during my second month of fieldwork I had participated in the meeting of a 
small group of mainly Scheduled Caste college students in one of the large government 
colleges in Bangalore.74 Walking to the nearby bus stand after the meeting, one of the 
students, a young man, asked me, if we also had castes in Denmark. Somewhat 
astounded by the question, I answered ‘No. In Denmark we don’t even know what castes 
are’. ‘But then, how do you tell the difference between people?’ he asked. ‘But we 
don’t’,’ I explained. ‘In Denmark we are basically one people only.’ Not satisfied with 
that answer, another student went on and asked if we had different religions in Denmark. 
To that I answered that there is a rather small number of newly immigrated Muslims in 
Denmark, but that the Danish people basically are Christians. ‘Catholics or Protestants?’ 
he asked. I answered that apart from a very small minority of Catholics, all Christians in 
                                                 
73 Interestingly enough, V.T. Rajshekar himself was ’a Dalit by choice’ as he expressed it since he 
actually belonged to the small, but powerful OBC-caste of Shettys (as his last discarded name 
suggested), which he disdainfully characterised as a ‘stupid caste’ of ‘bloody fools’.  V.T. 
Rajshekar did thus not himself practise caste the way he claimed that caste should be practised, 
when he preferred to struggle for the rights of the Scheduled Caste. 
74 The student activist group ’Chilume’ in Government Arts College cannot itself be characterised 
as a Dalit movement organisation, but many of the students participating in the group were also 
very active in the Dalit movement, which was the reason that I had been invited to participate in 
the meeting.  
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Denmark are Protestants. ‘But then you do have castes in Denmark,’ the student 
exclaimed almost triumphantly.  
In the meeting we had been discussing problems of discrimination of 
Scheduled Caste students in colleges, universities, and hostels and at least some of the 
students had nodded approvingly, when I – rather one-sidedly – had declared that I 
thought that caste ought to be abolished. However, my casual exchange of words with 
the students afterwards on the way to the bus stand clearly showed that the idea of a 
society without any caste distinctions in fact was quite inconceivable to many of them 
and not that desirable either, since caste provides identity and orientation in an otherwise 
confusingly heterogeneous society. Caste identity is thus a difference that makes a 
difference, so to speak, and not just an arbitrary label stuck on the head of individuals to 
mark their relative social status. 
The idea that the society is basically constituted by distinct, though often 
overlapping, named groups and communities, rather than simply by an infinite number of 
individuals is widespread among Dalit movement activists and sympathisers, as in the 
south Indian society at large. Remarks about ‘these people’ and ‘our people’ are common 
in everyday discourse and it is characteristic that the definition of ‘our people’ changes 
with the context. When used by Dalit activists in casual conversations, the expression 
‘our people’ may therefore refer to anything from the family-group, kula (subcaste), or 
caste of the subject speaking to all the Scheduled Castes or to the people of their village, 
their state, or even the country as opposed to people from other villages, states, or 
countries.75 The constant distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘others’ is in other words 
characteristic of the way that social relations are evaluated in contemporary Karnataka.  
It is indeed this principle of distinction and categorisation that according to the 
Sri Lankan-American anthropologist E. Valentine Daniel (1987) best characterises the 
notion of caste, which he argues shall not be understood as a separate system of social 
organisation, but as the reflection of a much more basic principle of differentiation and 
valuation, which is applied to almost all things and ‘substances’ on the basis of their 
supposed essences. According to this interpretation the social institution of caste is but 
one manifestation of an overall cosmology in which the notions of hierarchy and 
difference are inseparable and therefore caste cannot be discarded and abolished at will, 
unless the whole cosmology is dismantled. 
 
                                                 
75 M.N. Srinivas has termed this phenomenon ‘the horizontal stretch of castes’, indicating that the 
boundaries of caste are becoming increasingly elastic and contextual in the modern Indian society 
(Srinivas 1996:xiii).  
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Politics of caste and marriage 
The question of marriage and in particular inter-caste marriage was one of the issues that 
really divided the Dalit activists in their views on the aims and political strategies of the 
Dalit movement. For logically an increase of marriages across caste boundaries is the 
main prerequisite for abolishing the institution of caste, since this ultimately depends 
thoroughly on the observation of traditional endogamous marriage practices. The issue of 
marriage is therefore closely related to the schism between demands of personal 
emancipation and cultural recognition that is increasingly splitting the Dalit movement in 
Karnataka. However, the issue of marriage does also expose the sensitivity of the issue 
of caste and the personal and emotional dilemmas that are related to the questions of 
Dalit identity and Dalit struggle.  
The opinions voiced by Dalit activists on the promotion of inter-caste 
marriages as a political strategy ranged from complete approval to absolute rejection. 
Many former and contemporary DSS leaders and activists thought that the promotion of 
inter-caste marriages was crucial to reach the goal of a just and equal society without 
hierarchy and discrimination – and quite a number of activists were themselves married 
to women from higher castes, whom they had typically met as students in the university.  
Siddalingaiah was one of the Dalit leaders, who thought that inter-caste marriages had to 
be promoted as part of the Dalit movement’s political strategy. In the 1990s, 
Siddalingaiah had served as a nominated member of the legislative council in Karnataka 
and voted for the introduction of an economic reward of 25.000 rupees from the state 
government to couples marrying in inter-caste marriages. Siddalingaiah had actually 
himself suggested an incentive of 50.000 rupees even proposed the introduction of a 
special reservation quota for children of mixed parentage to further encourage inter-caste 
marriages, but these proposals had not been adopted by the legislative council. A typical 
argument in favour of inter-caste marriages was that there ought to be only two human 
castes: men and women – and that all people should therefore mix freely. 
Others, among them many BSP activists and members of the new, more 
culturally oriented Dalit organisations like the DMC – but also many members of the 
DSS – found that the question of marriage was not really suitable for political 
intervention because of its decidedly private character or they even thought that inter-
marriages were detrimental to the interest of the Scheduled Castes. The typical argument 
against inter-caste marriages between Scheduled Castes and higher castes was that such 
marriages tended to drive a wedge between the ‘Dalit boy’ and his family and 
community, who thereby lost a valuable male earning member to the upper castes.  
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When I spoke to a group of young DSS activists in the southern town of H.D. 
Kote they all stated that they were not in favour of inter-caste marriages, even though 
they defined the abolition of caste as the ultimate aim of Dalit struggle and declared that 
they liked the thought of a society free of caste. However, inter-caste marriages were a 
‘one way traffic’, they explained: ‘Dalits are marrying upper-caste girls, but not vice 
versa.’ Thus, inter-caste marriages were regarded as a loss to the Dalit community. 
‘Suppose a Dalit marries an upper caste girl, the children will still be Dalits, one of the 
young men explained: ‘Inter-caste marriages will not help. If a Dalit boy marries an 
upper caste girl, then for her it will be a comfortable life, while a Dalit girl cannot be 
happy if she is married to a boy from the upper castes, since she will definitely be ill-
treated by her in-laws because of her caste background.’ The practice of inter-caste 
marriage was thus regarded as too costly for the family and community in case of a ‘boy’ 
– and too costly for the individual in case of a ‘girl’ – to be politically feasible. 
The same interpretation of inter-caste marriages was expressed by the leader of 
the ‘Karnataka Dalit Christian Federation’ (KDCF), Y. Mariswamy: ’It is no problem if a 
Dalit koolie marries a Brahmin worker, but which type of marriages are we seeing? 
Through inter-caste marriages, Brahmins are gaining and Dalits are losing.’ The 
amounts paid by the bride’s family as dowry to the groom’s family were nowadays huge 
among the Brahmins, Mariswamy told, ’through inter-caste marriage, they can save 
their money. For many Dalit activists the practice of inter-caste marriage did thus not 
represent a political solution to caste-based discrimination and humiliation, but quite the 
contrary a cementation of the existing power relations and a direct threat to intra-caste 
solidarity.76 
Often, B.R. Ambedkar’s two marriages were invoked as examples to support 
the arguments either for or against the strategic promotion of inter-caste marriages. 
Activists in favour of inter-caste marriages called attention to Ambedkar’s second and 
self-chosen marriage with the Brahmin doctor Savita as an example to follow because it 
was based on the two parties’ personal preference for each other and not for the sake of 
the collective interests of the family and community. Activists, who were against inter-
caste marriages on the other hand, regarded Ambedkar’s second marriage as an example 
of how Brahmins would always try to manipulate and exploit Dalits; some even thought 
that Savita had actually forced Ambedkar to marry her against his will. They instead 
pointed out Ambedkar’s first marriage at the age of fifteen with the nine year old 
                                                 
76 Inter-caste marriages between people from different Scheduled Castes are even rarer than 
marriages between Scheduled Castes and Brahmins and thus this type of marriage was 
generally not considered by Dalit activists, when I asked them about their views on inter-caste 
marriages.  
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Ramabai from his own caste of Mahars as an example to follow since the education, 
wealth, and power of Ambedkar in this case favoured people from his own community.77  
Today, inter-caste marriages are generally ‘love marriages’, i.e., self-
arranged and often romance-based marriages, contrary to the still all-pervasive norm 
of arranged marriage. To propagate inter-caste marriages as a political strategy is thus 
also a strong statement in favour of the autonomy of the individual – and against the 
family and the caste community’s influence on the individual’s personal preferences 
and dispositions. As the writer, intellectual, and co-founder of the DSS, Devanoor 
Mahadev, himself married in an inter-caste marriage, pointed out caste is an obstacle 
to the human instincts; not least because of the strict observation of caste endogamy, 
that inhibits ‘natural’ love and attraction. However, prevalent norms and traditions 
also affect even rebellious and socially progressive Dalit activists. Therefore, many 
activists, who were decidedly in favour of inter-caste marriages, were themselves 
married in same-caste marriages, while a good number of activists that did not attach 
much political attention to the issue of marriage had actually themselves defied 
tradition and married outside their own caste. Even strong political convictions and 
ideals about liberation and equality may thus be difficult to reconcile with the 
everyday reality of caste for many Dalit activists.78 
The issue of marriage draws attention to the emotional attachment to ones 
community and cultural identity that I find is actually an important though largely 
ignored aspect of caste. As the mother searching for ‘a suitable boy’ for her daughter in 
Vikram Seth’s famous novel puts it, ‘one’s own community creates a sense of comfort’ 
(Seth in Fuller 2001: 27).  
When I asked a leading DSS activist in Bangalore, why he himself had chosen 
an arranged marriage with a woman from his own Holeya caste, he told me that marriage 
is a very intimate matter, in which one has to feel safe and comfortable. Having a good 
education and career, he had had marriage offers from girls from upper caste families, 
but even though he dreamt of a society completely free of caste distinctions, he felt that 
the caste differences between him and a potential upper caste partner would be too large 
to bridge in his private life. While he firmly believed that the practice of caste was the 
root cause of the oppression and discrimination of the Scheduled Castes and had to be 
abolished, he could not help practising it himself, when it came to marriage.  
                                                 
77 Tellingly, I have never seen any posters or pictures of Ambedkar with his second wife, Savita, 
for sale at Dalit movement functions and events, whereas posters depicting Ambedkar with his 
first wife Ramabai are quite common.  
78 See Mines (1994) for an analysis of the inherent conflict between the individual and the 
family/caste.   
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The issue of marriage – whether to chose a same caste or an inter-caste 
marriage – thus shows that the political interpretation of caste does not only constitute a 
strategic dilemma for the movement, but also an emotional dilemma for the individual 
Dalit activist. 
 
A sense of belonging  
While Dalit leaders and activists fought over the definition of Dalit identity, most of 
them (whether favouring the term Dalit or not) actually preferred to use the expression 
namma jana, ‘our people’ in casual conversation. Contrary to the contested political 
identities of Dalit, Buddhist and Bahujan Samaj, the highly elastic phrase ’namma jana’ 
expressed a sense of personal and emotional belonging; that the subject speaking was not 
culturally free-floating and socially autonomous, but part of a larger collective ‘we’. As I 
have shown in the previous paragraphs of this chapter, caste identity is in fact often 
perceived as a locus of solidarity, intimacy and security. Being together with one’s own, 
the activists often expressed, meant that they could feel more confident, secure and 
relaxed, without any fear of being discriminated against. This seemed to be the case for 
most activists, regardless whether they mainly perceived caste as a repressive hierarchy 
or as an expression of ethno-cultural difference. On the other hand, most activists also 
expressed that the community of caste was binding on the individual and in many ways 
restricted their personal freedom of choice, not only because of the discrimination and 
exploitation associated with Scheduled Caste identity, but also because of the 
expectations and large degrees of social control exerted by caste and family members.  
When Gorringe (2005), Guru and Chakravarty (2005) and other contemporary 
scholars criticise the Dalit movement of focusing on a politics of identity formation that 
reinforces the very institution of caste, they thus insist on defining caste and caste 
identities as pernicious and detrimental to social progress. As I have shown, however, 
many Dalit activists themselves in fact experienced their caste identities both as negative 
and stigmatising labels and as a source of solidarity, community and belonging. The 
strong sense of belonging and community associated with caste identity explains why the 
political dilemma between personal emancipation and cultural recognition was not only 
strategic and ideological, but also highly emotional. It was my impression that most Dalit 
activists were in fact torn between an urge to become a person in their own right and 
escape the devastating stigma of untouchability and the contradictory urge to strengthen 
the social and economic status of their community and gain respect and recognition for 
their cultural identity. While the Dalit organisations in Karnataka were split between 
representing caste either as an ‘unnatural’ imposed hierarchy or a ‘natural’ reflection of 
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ethno-cultural differences, the personal experience of caste thus often both contained 
aspects of hierarchy and difference.  
To foreshadow the conclusion of the thesis, I think that it is in the encounter 
between the two very different ways of perceiving and representing the meaning of caste 
and Dalit identity that we shall find the deeper, underlying reason for the political and 
organisational splits of the Dalit movement in Karnataka. As Jayaram (1996) notes the 
two dominant understandings of castes as, respectively, a rigid, hierarchical system and a 
dynamic structural principle based on cultural difference are equally true, though they 
appear to be mutually exclusive. Most Dalit activists did indeed, to different degrees, 
describe their caste identity both as a stigmatising, imposed label and as a source of 
community, belonging and in some cases even pride and thus related to caste as 
representing both hierarchy and difference.   
The schism between universalist and communitarian ways of politicising 
identity is, as I pointed out in the introduction, not unique to the Dalit movement, but is 
indeed found in most identity-based social movements (cf. Bernstein 1997, 2005; 
Gamson 1995; Heyes 2012; Jasper 2010).  For all stigmatised identity groups, whether 
ethnic, racial, sexual or gendered, the politicisation of identity is giving reason to the 
same profound dilemma between a politics of mainstreaming or ‘personal emancipation’, 
as I have termed it, and a politics of separatism or ‘cultural recognition’ that respectively 
denies and emphasises the existence of profound cultural or biological differences 
between the stigmatised group and the mainstream society. In all cases, the resulting 
political splits within identity-based social movements may be explained with reference 
to the ambiguous relationship between self-identity and cultural identity causing the 
contradictory political impulses of mainstreaming and separatism. In the case of the Dalit 
movement in Karnataka, the ambiguity of caste reinforces the dilemma between personal 
emancipation and cultural recognition since the oversimplified and incompatible models 
of hierarchy and difference stimulate contradictory interpretations of the reasons for the 
oppression and discrimination of the Scheduled Castes.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued that the political schism between universalist and 
communitarian ideals of liberation and equality that deeply divides the Dalit movement 
in Karnataka does not only reflect a strategic political dilemma for the leaders and 
activists of the movement, but also a personal and emotional dilemma. Although most 
activists had very strong opinions about the nature of caste, many found it difficult to act 
in accordance with their political convictions in their private lives, for example, in 
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relation to the decisive decision about whom to marry. The personal dilemmas related to 
the politicisation of caste were, I argue, related to the ambiguous reality of caste as 
representing both a repressive hierarchy and a manifestation of ethno-cultural difference 
and to the often conflicting interests of the individual and the community. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have shown how the political and ideological splits that characterised the 
Dalit movement in Karnataka in the early 2000s – and continue to characterise the 
movement by the 2010s – reflect a number of deep-seated ambiguities pertaining to the 
notion of Dalit identity and its politicisation.  
 Examining the history of the Dalit movement in Karnataka, I have shown that 
the movement right since its emergence has been marked by a strategic dilemma between 
a universalist quest for personal emancipation and a communitarian quest for cultural 
recognition. The politicisation of Dalit identity has thus always constituted a genuine 
dilemma to the Dalit movement that has balanced between representing Dalits as the 
downtrodden, stigmatised victims of caste oppression and as bearers of a rich cultural 
tradition bereft of due recognition. While the changed political environment of the 1990s 
may explain the immediate reasons behind the Dalit movement’s sudden thorough 
fragmentation, I have argued that the underlying reasons for the conflicting political 
agendas existing within the movement must be sought in the ambiguous meanings 
attributed to identity and caste.  
 The study shows that caste membership for most Dalit activists is filled with 
mixed emotions, at the same time constituting a source of anxiety, shame and inferiority 
and a source of pride, security and solidarity. The seemingly insoluble dilemma between 
the wish for inclusion into the so-called ‘mainstream’ and the wish for cultural 
recognition of the Scheduled Castes as a respectable and dignified community thus 
reflects the overall ambiguity of the political identity of Dalit. With caste being 
commonly interpreted both as an ancient, religiously legitimised status hierarchy 
integrating all castes in a common system and as a dynamic social structure of 
autonomous, ethno-cultural communities competing for status and power, the political 
answer to the continuing discrimination and exploitation of the Scheduled Castes largely 
depends on which of the two interpretations that is emphasised.  
When a growing number of Dalit organisations in the early 2000s interpreted 
caste primarily as an expression of ethno-cultural difference it must be explained with 
reference to a number of interrelated reasons. The consolidation of the categories of caste 
– and of their hierarchical order – resulting from the continuation and extension of the 
reservation policies to the large section of Other Backward Classes in the early 1990s, 
has, as described in chapter three, made it difficult even to imagine an abolition of caste 
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in many years to come. Quite the contrary, caste has become an increasingly central 
issue of Indian politics the past decades with the help of the Dalit movement that 
strongly supported the extension of reservation benefits to the OBCs.  
The increased strength of the Hindu nationalist movement and ideology is 
another factor, which may explain why a considerable number of Dalit activists were 
defending a communitarian approach to Dalit liberation. The rightist ideology of Hindu 
nationalism that, on the one hand, included the Scheduled Castes into the Hindu fold and, 
on the other, maintained their subordinate status in the Hindu hierarchy, was in fact used 
both as an argument for a community centred politics of strengthening the Scheduled 
Castes and for a radical anti-caste politics, since most Dalit activists regarded political 
Hinduism as the greatest enemy of the Scheduled Castes.   
The ideological turn in the Indian academia from the grand theories of the 
modern period to the post-structuralist and post-colonial theories influencing the 
universities from the 1990s onwards has, as suggested in chapter five, further contributed 
to the gradual and partial shift of focus from the individual to the community.  
A last reason that I will point out, which this thesis has discussed only 
cursorily, is the tensions between different identity groups within the Dalit movement 
that have increased since the 1990s. As described in chapter three, the political solidarity 
between the Scheduled Castes symbolised by the identity of Dalit has never been 
extended to everyday life, despite the overwhelming support of the Dalit movement in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The political alliance between notably Holeyas and Madigas 
therefore relies on the identification of common courses like the struggles against caste 
and untouchability, while the increasingly important issues of reservation and cultural 
identity, on the other hand, encourage caste consciousness  and separate mobilisation. 
Altogether the here mentioned factors all seem to have contributed to the 
political reorientation of large parts of the Dalit movement and to the increased schism of 
the movement.  
As we have seen, the communitarian tendencies within the Dalit movement 
have been criticised of consolidating the very social structures and identities that cause 
the oppression of the Scheduled Castes. However, the present study suggests that the 
struggle for cultural recognition may as well be interpreted as a radical challenge to the 
‘untouchable’ identity ascribed to the majority of the Scheduled Caste population and to 
the socially dominant norms and values of the ‘upper castes’. From a scholarly point of 
view, the schism between politics of personal emancipation and cultural recognition 
should not be evaluated in terms of their political ‘progressivity’, but understood as 
representing two radically different visions of a socially equal and just Indian society.  
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While the Dalit movement is profoundly split with regard to the representation 
of Dalit identity, most scholars (e.g., Deliége 2001; Gorringe 2005b;  Madsen1996; 
Mosse 1999) and national and international NGOs (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2001, 
IDSN 2002) agree to define Dalit identity in accordance with its original meaning, 
representing a ‘broken’ and downtrodden state of being. As the study shows, this 
representation of Dalit identity is but one aspect of the complex identifications available 
to people from the Scheduled Castes. The emotional attachment that many Dalit activists 
feel with their caste communities is an aspect of Dalit identity which has largely been 
neglected by scholars of the Dalit movement. 
Therefore, I find that the personal and political ambivalences and dilemmas 
connected with the politicisation of Dalit identity that I have pointed out are the most 
important findings of the study.  
The realisation that the political struggle against caste-based exploitation and 
discrimination is not a straightforward matter, but filled with conflicts, dilemmas and 
ambiguities, is a reminder to scholars as well as (inter)national NGOs and advocacy 
networks that in different ways seek to aid and influence the Dalit movement that there 
are no politically neutral positions in support of the Scheduled Castes. Whether the 
identity of Dalit is represented as ‘broken’ and downtrodden or as culturally rich and 
vibrant, it constitutes a political statement in the ongoing debate about the means and 
aims of the Dalit movement. The findings of the present study moreover marks a break 
with the idea of a coherent ‘Dalit constituency’ based on shared identity and common 
political interests. As we have seen the Scheduled Castes in Karnataka do not only 
identify themselves in a multitude of different ways, they also pursue widely different 
political aims and interests.  
For the Dalit movement in Karnataka, the realisation of the profound 
ambiguities and dilemmas connected with the politicisation of Dalit identity may lead to 
a better understanding of the reasons for the current splits and conflicts. The loss of the 
unity and solidarity that originally was the very raison d’être of the Dalit movement was 
a source of great frustration for Dalit leaders and activists from all parts of the 
movement. Again and again during the fieldwork, I was asked if I thought that my study 
could somehow help bringing the Dalits back on a common platform. This is obviously 
not the case. Quite the contrary, I hope that a growing realisation of the many profoundly 
different political strategies and positions within the Dalit movement will lead to a 
greater acceptance of the present situation where the struggle for equality, freedom and 
social justice for the Scheduled Castes is fought by many different means on many 
different fronts.  
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ABSTRACT 
The thesis addresses the growing political and ideological splits and disagreements in the 
Dalit movement in the south Indian state of Karnataka in the early 2000s.  
The Dalit movement in Karnataka was one of the first collective struggles for 
the rights of the Scheduled Castes in India – and probably the longest sustained. By the 
turn of the century, however, the Dalit movement had lost its former political strength 
and was marked by splits and internal rivalry to the great frustration of many activists 
and sympathisers. While some parts of the Dalit movement blamed the social and 
economic deprivation of the Scheduled Castes on the institution of caste, which they 
considered intrinsically oppressive and discriminatory, still more Dalit activists and 
organisations voiced the opinion that caste was an integral, even natural part of Indian 
culture and history which could and should not be abolished. The Dalit movement was 
thus profoundly divided between organisations and groupings sticking to the original 
anti-caste agenda of the movement and newer organisations and groupings claiming that 
it was the unequal distribution of power, wealth and social status between the different 
castes in the Indian society which was the problem, not the institution of caste itself.  
Based on eleven months ethnographic fieldwork among leaders, activists and 
sympathisers from a number of different Dalit organisations and groupings in Karnataka, 
the study examines the reasons for the increasing political division of the Dalit 
movement and asks why large parts of the Dalit movement in reality have abandoned the 
struggle against caste and untouchability in favour of a struggle for cultural recognition 
and political power.  
Examining the early history of the Dalit movement in Karnataka, the study 
shows that the movement right since its emergence in the early 1970s has been marked 
by a schism between what I have termed as ‘a politics of personal emancipation’ 
stressing the need to set the individual free from the oppressive stigma of untouchability 
and ‘a politics of cultural recognition’ stressing the need to restore the cultural pride of 
the Scheduled Castes and gain power collectively. The schism was accentuated in the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s, when the issue of identity assumed centre stage in Indian 
politics and claims for cultural recognition by various identity groups began to 
overshadow claims for economic redistribution and social justice. The politicisation of 
Dalit identity has thus always constituted a genuine dilemma to the Dalit movement that 
has balanced between representing Dalits as the downtrodden, stigmatised victims of 
caste oppression and as bearers of a rich cultural tradition bereft of due recognition. 
Though the changed political environment of the 1990s may explain the immediate 
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reasons behind the Dalit movement’s sudden thorough fragmentation, the thesis argues 
that the underlying reasons for the conflicting political agendas existing within the 
movement must be sought in the ambiguous meanings attributed to the notions of 
identity and caste.  
The study shows that an important factor in explaining the political split of the 
Dalit movement is the oversimplified dichotomy of hierarchy and difference that has 
characterised the representation of caste in India since the early twentieth century. As 
established representations of caste, the largely incompatible models of hierarchy and 
difference stimulate contradictory interpretations of the reasons for the oppression and 
discrimination of the Scheduled Castes and lead to conflicting political strategies for its 
solution. While activists agitating for the abolition of caste generally described caste as a 
repressive, religiously embedded hierarchy, activists agitating for the need of cultural 
recognition and political power, on the other hand, usually described caste as a social 
manifestation of profound ethno-cultural difference. Within the Dalit movement caste 
was thus represented either as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the upper 
castes or as a potential source of social and political strength and cultural belonging.  
Interviews with leaders and activists from the Dalit movement in Karnataka, 
however, show that their personal experiences of caste in almost all cases related both to 
the hierarchical and cultural dimensions of caste and that many in their private lives 
actually found it difficult to act in accordance with their political convictions when it 
came to the issue of caste: e.g., in relation to the decisive decision about whom to marry. 
Neither of the two dominant representations of caste did thus adequately correspond to 
the Dalit activists’ actual experiences of caste and caste identity as elastic and contextual 
realities. Nonetheless the idioms of hierarchy and difference continued to provide the 
basic language for discussing the overall political disagreements within the Dalit 
movement and thus contributed to the frozen conflict between old-time anti-caste 
organisations and newer ‘pro-caste’ organisations.  
 
